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Abstract
This article analyses the interstate dispute settle-
ment mechanisms between member states of the 
German Confederation (Deutscher Bund). The 
question as to how disputes between German 
sovereigns should be decided already had a long 
(pre-)history dating back to the Middle Ages. 
Article 11 IV of the German Federal Act (1815) 
(Bundesakte) was the basic norm of the so-called 
Austrägal jurisdiction enacted to resolve disputes 
between states of the German Confederation and 
stipulated the manner in which the dispute was to 
be brought to ›court‹ (Austrägalinstanz). During the 
period of the German Confederation, 10 out of 
25 German courts of third instance handled alto-
gether 54 Austrägal cases. Whereas Austrägal juris-
diction was no longer present in the German 
Kaiserreich, Emperor William II and the professor 
of public law Paul Laband attempted to resurrect 
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Introduction
The laws and court cases of past centuries are 
more than precursors to present legal arrange-
ments. Legal history should include more than 
the analysis of alleged path dependencies that lead 
to the current majority views or current organisa-
tions. Instead, the question of how in previous 
centuries disputes between states were regulated 
can lead to the discovery of institutions that can 
hardly be described as the ›forerunners‹ of present 
responses to this problem.
The debate about interstate dispute settlement – 
the aim of which was to maintain peace and to 
avoid war – goes back to the Middle Ages, if not 
ancient Greece. Numerous are the authors who 
hoped for the taming and ›civilising‹ power of the 
law. Some of them envisioned a sort of interna-
tional court of nations, where sovereigns could lay 
claims against each other, and where wise men 
would hear their case and decide strictly in accord-
ance with the requirements of justice. The law 
should act as the ›sovereign of sovereigns‹. The 
texts of Abbé de Saint Pierre (Union Européen, 
1712) and Immanuel Kant (Perpetual Peace, 1795) 
were influential already in their time. And there is 
a history not only of the ideas about interstate 
dispute settlement, but also a history of its practice. 
This history necessarily includes the sceptics of this 
idea too. The politics of interstate dispute resolu-
tion, the actions of those putting the institutions in 
place and their rules responsible for deciding dis-
putes had to navigate between these hopes and 
concerns.
The history of the interstate dispute settlement 
mechanisms of the German Confederation (Deut-
scher Bund), described here in nine (very short) 
chapters, attest to both the hopes attached to 
applying the law in interstate relations and to 
the concerns that law could never bind sover-
eigns independently of their will. In a very con-
crete sense, the arrangements found in the early 
19th century mirror what the contemporary phi-
losopher Georg Fr. Hegel had to say about Imma-
nuel Kant’s ideas regarding (the future of) interna-
tional law: »There is no judge over states, at most 
only a referee or mediator, and even the mediato-
rial function is only an accidental thing, being due 
to particular wills.«1 When he wrote this in 1821, 
the German states were bound to a dispute settle-
ment mechanism that was characterised by politi-
cal mediation (attempts), legal procedure and – if 
necessary – forceful execution against an unwilling 
party. This is in part more than what current 
arrangements allow for. But even contemporaries 
had asked about the kind of disputes that such 
provisions – if at all – could be solved. In the end, 
they were in place for 51 years, that is, until the end 
of the German Confederation in 1866.
A few words about the term ›interstate dispute‹ 
seem appropriate: It may appear surprising to find 
such a term applied to an ›inner‹ German context. 
However, in the 18th or 19th centuries this was not 
unusual. Numerous German states, many of which 
can barely be recalled, were sovereign. A unified 
Germany was unheard of at that point in time. For 
a better understanding of the context concerning 
this special case of interstate dispute settlement, 
called Austrägal jurisdiction, it is therefore impor-
tant to recall the degree to which German states 
retained their independence, understood as their 
status as subjects of international law, also after the 
Congress of Vienna (1815). Throughout most of 
the 19th century, states located in a political and 
cultural territory called Germany (Deutschland) by 
contemporaries were sovereign. They were fully 
1 Hegel (2001) § 333 (»Es gibt keinen 
Prätor, höchstens Schiedsrichter und 
Vermittler zwischen Staaten, und 
auch diese nur zufälligerweise, d. i. 
nach besonderen Willen.«, Hegel
(1986) [1821] § 333, 500). Unless 
otherwise stated, all translations into 
English are my own.
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recognised members of the ›concert‹ of European 
states. Other European governments acknowl-
edged not only the sovereignty of Prussia or Aus-
tria, but also that of smaller German states. To give 
but one example: The French Annuaire Diploma-
tique of 1859 listed in the first section the Souve-
rains de l’Europe. It commenced with Autriche and 
Bavière, but Hanover, Saxony and Württemberg 
were also named. In a separate entry, 22 smaller 
États d’Allemagne, including all their princes, their 
titles and families, were documented over the 
course of 19 pages.2 Still in 1865, the Hanseatic 
cities of Bremen, Lübeck and Hamburg concluded 
a treaty of commerce and navigation under inter-
national law with the French Empire.3
Given the German states’ status as sovereign 
members of the »concert of Europe«, it is not 
altogether surprising that legal provisions regard-
ing the dispute settlement of the German Confed-
eration and its predecessor, the Holy Roman Em-
pire, were analysed (or at least mentioned) by 
(international) lawyers when questions of interna-
tional arbitration were of particular political rele-
vance. Prior to the First World War, »arbitration« 
had become »the catchword of the day«.4 Its 
pacifist advocates sought historical arguments to 
support their hopes for »peace through law«. In an 
overview article on the »formation of international 
law«, Ernest Nys, a member of the Institut de Droit 
International since 1892 and later on the list of 
Belgian members of the Permanent Court of Ar-
bitration, referred approvingly to the German 
Empire’s Austrägal jurisdiction that he laid out in 
some detail. Reference was also made to historic 
Austrägal courts in the American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, when the recent history of the Hague 
International Court of Arbitration was analysed.5
The (encouraging) argument supported by these 
historic descriptions was most of all that interstate 
dispute settlement is possible and has been possible 
by recourse to law. Why this was (or was not) 
possible is the subject matter of the pages that 
follow.
1 Historical Background. Principles of the 
German Confederation (Deutscher Bund)
Considering the partition of Poland in 1795, 
historian Manfred Botzenhard spoke of a »prelude 
to the unscrupulous power politics of the great 
[powers] at the expense of small ones, which 
should characterise the style of European politics 
in the following decades«. In 1803, the Reichsdepu-
tationshauptschluss (Law on the ›final recess of the 
Extraordinary Imperial Delegation‹) secularised in 
the Holy Roman Empire around 70 ecclesiastical 
states and abolished 45 imperial cities to compen-
sate German princes for territories to the west of 
the river Rhine that had been annexed by France. 
This, along with the mediatisations from 1806 to 
1814 that transferred the sovereignty of smaller 
states within Germany to their larger neighbours 
and other annexations, proved this »power politics 
… at the expense of small ones«. In contrast, in its 
defining texts, the post-Napoleonic order estab-
lished at the Congress of Vienna spoke a different 
language. In the Peace Treaty of Paris (30 May 
1814), the allied governments had already agreed 
on the future of the German principalities: »Ar-
ticle VI. Les États de l’Allemagne seront indépen-
dants et unis par un lien fédératif.« On the surface 
it appeared as if the negotiations in Vienna in 1815 
had established a consensus that the relations 
between European and, in particular between the 
German states should be based on mechanisms of 
negotiation and balance amongst equals. For the 
representatives of the German power houses of the 
day, Austria and Prussia, durable stability within 
the purview of the former Holy Roman Empire 
was to be realistically achieved in the form of a 
»federal state« (föderativer Bundesstaat). However, 
the negotiations in Vienna clearly showed the 
danger that Austria and Prussia could very well 
use a federal constitution to undermine the sov-
ereignty of medium- and small-sized German states 
agreed on in Paris. In the end, the latter’s »fierce 
resistance against the [Austro-Prussian] constitu-
tional politics was … completely successful«.6 In-
2 Annuaire Diplomatique de l’Empire 
Français pour l’année 1859.
3 Richefort (2006).
4 Riemens (2010) 81.
5 Nys (1912) 302 f.; Myers (1914) 800.




stead, the German Confederation (Deutsche Bund) 
was constituted as an indissoluble alliance of 39 
»equal and sovereign states« that was, a few years 
later, legally defined as an »association under inter-
national law« (völkerrechtlicher Verein) (Article 1 
Wiener Schlussakte 1820 [hereinafter WSA]).7
The constitutional arrangements of the German 
Confederation were set down in a number of 
covenants, the most important of which was the 
Federal Act (Bundesakte) of 8 June 1815 – also de-
scribed as the German »basic law« (der Grundvertrag 
und das erste Grundgesetz dieses [völkerrechtlichen] 
Vereins, Art. III WSA). As part of the Vienna Con-
gress Act (Articles 53 to 64), the Bundesakte was 
also an international treaty signed and guaranteed 
by all the major European powers. However, it 
described the political and legal structure of the 
Confederation »only in the most important ele-
mentary features«. In subsequent years a number 
of special resolutions of ministerial conferences or 
the Federal Convention (Bundesversammlung or 
Bundestag) in Frankfurt / Main – a permanent con-
gress of instruction-bound envoys of their 39 Ger-
man principalities (including one representative of 
the four free cities: Frankfurt / Main, Bremen, 
Hamburg, Lübeck) – detailed the structure of the 
confederation. Among the most relevant were 
several acts on the Confederation’s military con-
stitution8 as well as acts on the judicial settlement 
of disputes between member states.
The independent member states committed 
themselves to collectively maintaining their for-
eign and domestic security. They were entitled to 
conclude treaties under international law, but were 
not permitted to conclude treaties against the 
confederation or its individual members, let alone 
to wage war against each other (Article 11 III 
Federal Act). However, they were free with regard 
to their domestic policies, unless the Federal Con-
vention unanimously approved a decision affecting 
domestic politics.9
Whereas the previous decades had been domi-
nated by war and power politics that had seen 
»the small« suffering at the hands of »the large« 
states, the political as well as the legal order of the 
German Confederation was consciously focused 
on the preservation of the status quo as agreed in 
1815. In the Federal Convention this resulted in 
a jealous safeguarding of the independence and 
sovereignty of all member states, be they small or 
large. But beneath the surface more was happen-
ing; there were activities pointing toward a chang-
ing zeitgeist. Three months after signing the Bun-
desakte in Vienna, the rulers of Russia, Austria and 
Prussia founded in Paris the Holy Alliance. Tsar 
Alexander, the spiritus rector of the Alliance, was 
influenced by German pietism when he formu-
lated his ideas of a Christian alliance safeguarding 
not only peace, but the religious, moral and polit-
ical order of Europe’s monarchies against revolu-
tions. In Paris, he and the two most prominent 
princes of the German Confederation promised 
each other to act on the basis of »justice, love and 
peace«, both in domestic and foreign affairs, for the 
purpose of »consolidating human institutions and 
remedying their imperfections«.10
It might be easy to identify the »remedying« of 
human »imperfections« with the »police state« 
erected in the spirit of the Holy Alliance’s struggle 
against nationalists and other revolutionaries 
under the auspices of the German Confederation. 
Indeed, the first federal institution set up after 1815 
was the political police.11 Yet, this concern for 
(political) unrest did not merely dominate policies 
7 Eichhorn (1833) 1; Scheuner (1976) 
20, 22.
Art. I. WSA »Der deutsche Bund ist 
ein völkerrechtlicher Verein der 
deutschen souverainen Fürsten und 
freien Städte, zur Bewahrung der 
Unabhängigkeit und Unverletzbar-
keit ihrer im Bunde begriffenen 
Staaten, und zur Erhaltung der in-
nern und äußern Sicherheit Deutsch-
lands.«
Art. II. WSA »Dieser Verein besteht in 
seinem Innern als eine Gemeinschaft 
selbständiger, unter sich unabhängi-
ger Staaten, mit wechselseitigen glei-
chen Vertrags-Rechten und Vertrags-
Obliegenheiten, in seinen äußern 
Verhältnissen aber, als eine in politi-
scher Einheit verbundene Gesammt-
Macht.«
I will abstain here from detailing the 
history of the concept of »confedera-
tion« (Staatenbund), but will merely 
refer to Samuel Pufendorf; for a more 
contemporary contextualisation of 
Pufendorf cf. Preuss (1889) 11–17.
8 Angelow (1996).
9 Bauer (1992) 32; Botzenhart (1985) 
16.
10 Rey (2009) 358 f.; Menger (2009); 
Ghervas (2008); Bourquin (1954).
11 Botzenhart (1985) 90. After the 
Carlsbad decrees (1819), the »Investi-
gation Law« prompted the establish-
ment of a central state police agency – 
the central investigative commission 
– which was situated in the federal 
fortress of Mainz until 1828. This 
commission was authorised to seek 
out and pursue »revolutionary activi-
ties« directed at either the federal go-
vernment or individual states therein.
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within the member states of the Confederation. 
Until 1848, the basic principle of the ›Metternich 
system‹ was shaped by the conviction that all 
European states had an overriding common inter-
est in maintaining peace, law and order as well as 
in preserving external and internal stability and 
security. It was thus a moral and legal obligation to 
protect this order under the principles of solidarity 
and reciprocity.12 The independence of the Euro-
pean states was best guaranteed by a system of 
equilibrium committed to these principles; this 
system would be able to balance the dynamics of 
power politics and would protect the small states 
from the preponderance of large states.13 Further-
more, there was an indisputable inward looking 
tendency among German governments. After years 
of upheaval and dramatic impoverishment of the 
populace, the reconstruction of social peace within 
the states was given greater importance than the 
restoration of international political dominance. 
In their writings several conservative exponents of 
the Vormärz exhibited political thinking moving in 
a similar direction. They were hostile to any 
thoughts about the nation state, since it opposed 
the principle of an assumed universal (European 
monarchical) legal and moral system (as implied 
by the Holy Alliance); this is a conception at odds 
with the principle of national egotism, which 
threatened to embroil the states in constant strug-
gles for their individual interests, prestige power 
and dominance.14
One might assume that this thinking in terms of 
international balance (for Metternich this meant 
primarily the prevention of revolutions) may have 
led to policies that granted little prominence to 
reconciling opposing interests between members 
of the Confederation by legal means. No doubt, 
considering the alleged fundamental convergence 
of all the sovereigns’ interests, disputes were seen as 
regrettable exceptions, rather than as part of legit-
imate political behaviour. However, the years and 
decades following the Vienna Congress saw a 
steady engagement of high politics with questions 
of legal dispute settlement between states of the 
German Confederation. Too many convoluted le-
gal issues haunted state administrations across Ger-
man borders, too much money and honour was at 
stake to leave all the underlying questions to be 
resolved by means of diplomatic negotiation. 
Therefore, matters of (federal) court procedures, 
applicable law and justiciability remained on the 
agenda of the German Federal Convention.
2 Legal Dispute Mechanisms between 
German States. A Short Overview
By the time the Congress of Vienna took place, 
the question of how disputes between German 
sovereigns should be decided already had a long 
and controversial (pre-) history dating back to the 
Middle Ages. Since at least the 14th century, princes 
had enjoyed the privilege of seeking justice among 
their peers who were ad hoc appointed to sit as 
arbitrators in case a dispute arose between two or 
more holders of such privileges. This ius austraega-
rum (probably a Latinised form of the German verb 
»austragen«, referring to settling a dispute15) was 
thus related to what German constitutional histor-
ians call the Standesgerichtsbarkeit among the Ger-
man nobility (loosely translated »trial by peers«). 
The rules of the Imperial Chamber Court (Reichs-
kammergericht), which had been the Holy Roman 
Empire’s highest court since 1495 (together with 
the Aulic Court [Reichshofrat] in Vienna) explicitly 
acknowledged the right of the German princes and 
other »immediate« barons (Freiherren) to the so-
called Austräge (Recht der Austräge).16 The Peace of 
Westphalia (1648), again, guaranteed these privi-
leges, which included the settlement of disputes 
that would be – in modern terms – characterised as 
civil and constitutional matters. While in civil 
actions the Austrägal jurisdiction was losing influ-
ence to ordinary courts, during the 18th century 
constitutional cases, understood as legal questions 
of high political relevance between two princes, 
continued to be handled between peers, that is, a 
third German sovereign.17
12 Hardtwig (1985) 33–39.
13 Botzenhart (1985) 86.
14 Botzenhart (1985) 131.
15 Leonhardi (1838) 13–15; Grimm: 
Deutsches Wörterbuch (1853), Bd. 1, 
Sp. 1001, Art. »austrag«; Betz (2007) 
4–7.
16 Zachariä (1845) 298 f.; Diestelkamp
(1994); Diestelkamp (2013); cf. for an 
overview in English Nys (1912) 302.
17 Hinkel (1984) 26 f.
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It was in this latter sense that dispute mecha-
nisms between the German states were discussed as 
Austrägalinstanzen during and following the Napo-
leonic era. In Article 9 of the Act establishing the 
Confederated States of the Rhine (Rheinbund; États 
confédérés du Rhin, 12 July 1806), a union of client 
states to the French Empire under Napoleon I, the 
Bundestag (Diète, an assembly of the Princes) in 
Frankfurt was identified as the institution that 
should resolve conflicts between member states.18
In 1814/5, Prussia, Austria and a number of smaller 
states even tabled different designs for a permanent 
ordinary federal court that should decide on dis-
putes between German states. As they understood 
it, the future German Confederation, while aiming 
to maintain internal security, should also provide 
for a regulated system of legal dispute settlement 
between members of the confederation. In Febru-
ary 1815, a representative of Prussia declared, »that 
as long as the federal constitution lacks a federal 
court, one will never be able to reverse the con-
viction that the structure of Germany lacks the last 
and most necessary keystone«.19
However, representatives of Bavaria, Württem-
berg and the Grand Duchy of Hesse – adherents of 
the strong (southern) German particularism – were 
worried about the impediment of their sovereignty 
by strong federal institutions.20 They argued that 
the German Confederation was a confederation 
and not a federal state. Considering the sovereignty 
of individual members, it would thus be legally 
impossible to transfer a general jurisdiction over all 
its members to the Confederation. Instead, the 
Federal Convention would have to authorise for 
each individual case one of the highest regional 
courts of member states to deliver an award for 
individual disputes; this court would act »on behalf 
of« the Confederations highest decision-making 
body. This proposal, therefore, did not follow in 
the tradition of the Reichskammergericht (abolished 
in 1806) as the central and highest German court 
authority. Instead of a specific institution, the 
southern German states insisted on their absolute 
judicial sovereignty and advocated a non-central-
ised solution. They pointed to the ›older‹ tradition 
of settling disputes between German sovereigns, 
i. e. the Austrägal jurisdiction by ad hoc chosen 
arbitration bodies. In order not to jeopardise the 
conclusion of the Federal Act in its entirety, Bava-
ria, Prussia and other proponents of an ordinary 
federal court agreed in the future to set up an 
Austrägalinstanz in each individual case.
A sort of federal supervision of the state juris-
dictions can be read into Article 12 of the Federal 
Act (1815) by assigning the smaller member states 
to set-up high courts (meaning courts of third 
instance). A few years later Article 29 of the Vienna 
Final Act (1820) empowered the Federal Conven-
tion in Frankfurt / Main to step-in on behalf of 
individuals against obstructions of justice in any 
member state.21 Thus, the Federal Convention, 
which was to remain the only permanent institu-
tion of the German Confederation, possessed – in 
addition to its legislative and executive – judicial 
powers.22 It was in general responsible for the 
settlement of disputes within the German Confed-
eration, be it between member states, between 
state governments / the monarch and their legisla-
tures or (to a limited extent) between individuals 
and member states. In the German Confederation, 
not only governments of the member states pos-
sessed special rights in terms of dispute settlement. 
Also within member states there were categories of 
(natural or legal) persons who were »exempted« 
18 »Art. IX. Toutes les contestations
qui s’élèveront entre les États con-
fédérés seront décidées par la Diète
de Francfort«.
19 »daß, solange es der Bundesverfas-
sung an einem Bundesgerichte fehlt, 
man nie wird die Überzeugung auf-
heben können, daß dem Gebäude
in Deutschland der letzte und noth-
wendigste Schlußstein fehle«, cit. in: 
Dr. von Linde, Entwurf des Vortrages 
des Bundestags-Ausschusses eines 
Bundesgerichtes, vorgelegt 23.1.1860, 
Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Dres-
den (SHStA) 10718, Nr. 17, Bl. 11; cf. 
Klüber (1816) 17.
20 Bönnemann (2007) 24 f.
21 Article 29 WSA (1820) »Wenn in ei-
nem Bundesstaate der Fall einer Jus-
tiz-Verweigerung eintritt, und auf 
gesetzlichen Wegen ausreichende 
Hülfe nicht erlangt werden kann,
so liegt der Bundesversammlung ob, 
erwiesene, nach der Verfassung und 
den bestehenden Gesetzen jedes 
Landes zu beurtheilende Beschwer-
den über verweigerte oder gehemmte 
Rechtspflege anzunehmen, und da-
rauf die gerichtliche Hülfe bei der 
Bundesregierung, die zu der Be-
schwerde Anlaß gegeben hat, zu be-
wirken.« Cf. Klüber (1822) 236 rea-
soning: »denn der oberste Grundsatz 
des Bundes ist, daß unter allen Bun-
desgliedern und in allen Bundes-
staaten kein anderer als ein recht-
licher Zustand bestehen müsse«; cf. 
Scheuner (1976) 26 f.
22 Leonhardi (1838) 91 f.; Grimm
(1988) 67.
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from ordinary courts, most of them belonging to 
different classes of nobility like the landed gentry; 
the latter often kept their rights to patrimonial 
courts until (or after) the Revolution of 1848/49.23
Although the German Confederation was nei-
ther a legal successor to the Holy Roman Empire, 
nor to the Confederated States of the Rhine, legal 
positions (Rechtsverhältnisse) established in these 
periods also continued after 1814, unless they were 
expressly declared to be revoked. The continued 
validity of previously founded legal positions was 
of major importance for the Austrägal jurisdiction, 
since many disputes brought before the Austrägal
courts were related to questions about these legal 
positions.24
3 »Not to Wage War against Each Other«.
The Laws of the Austrägal Procedures, 
1815–1866
Within five years after a compromise on the 
question of German interstate dispute settlement 
was found in Vienna, the procedural details of the 
Austrägal jurisdiction were finalised. In fact, the 
Hesse councillor Friedrich Wilhelm von Leonhar-
di argued in his magisterial treatise on the Austrägal
jurisdiction (1838) that the »German Confedera-
tion is still too recent (neu), in order to feature 
already a complete constitutional law«.25 But the 
provision regarding the German interstate dispute 
settlement in place then remained unaltered until 
the dissolution of the German Confederation fol-
lowing the Austro-Prussian war in 1866.
The basic norm of the Austrägal jurisdiction was 
Article 11 IV of the German Federal Act (1815), 
decreeing:
»The Federal Members … undertake not to 
wage war against each other under any pretext, 
or to settle their conflicts by force, but to refer 
them to the Federal Convention. By a commit-
tee, the latter is thereupon obliged to attempt to 
mediate; should this attempt fail, and thus a 
judicial decision become necessary, [the Federal 
Convention] would have to effect it through a 
well-ordered Austrägal instance to whose award 
the disputing parties have to submit immedi-
ately.«26
Article 11, in its prohibition of war between 
German states, explicitly juxtaposed the use of 
force and the recourse to judicial settlement. How-
ever, the future constitutional and political devel-
opment would show that the two had to be seen 
rather in conjunction. In order to regulate the 
details of the »well-ordered Austrägal instance« 
and to give legal substance to the Federal Act, the 
Federal Convention enacted three key laws: the 
Austrägal Decree (Austrägalordnung [AO], June 16, 
1817), the Vienna Final Act (Wiener Schlussakte
[WSA], May 15, 1820)27 and the Federal War 
Constitution (Bundeskriegsverfassung, April 9; April 
12, 182128). During the negotiations leading to the 
Austrägal Decree, the regret was repeatedly put on 
record that in 1815 no agreement concerning a 
permanent federal court had been achieved. Article 
3 AO consequently emphasised that the »proposal 
for setting up a permanent Austrägal commission 
… is not considered abandoned«; instead, this »first 
proposition« would be reviewed again, after having 
acquired more experience, at a later date. In 1819/
20, during the Vienna Ministerial Conferences, 
proposals towards a federal court were again dis-
cussed. However, due to the continuing concerns 
of some members of the Confederation that such 
an institute would constrain their sovereignty, no 
agreement in this respect was concluded.29
The detailed procedural steps, as provided for in 
the Austrägal Decree (AO), can be summarised as 
follows: According to Articles 1 and 2 AO, and in 
accordance with the Federal Act, the interstate 
23 Wienfort (1994).
24 Frühauf (1976) 78.
25 Leonhardi (1838) viii.
26 Artikel 11 IV Bundesacte: »Die Bun-
des-Glieder machen sich … verbind-
lich, einander unter keinerley Vor-
wand zu bekriegen, noch ihre Strei-
tigkeiten mit Gewalt zu verfolgen, 
sondern sie bey der Bundesversamm-
lung anzubringen. Dieser liegt als-
dann ob, die Vermittlung durch ei-
nen Ausschuß zu versuchen; falls 
dieser Versuch fehlschlagen sollte, 
und demnach eine richterliche Ent-
scheidung nothwendig würde, solche 
durch eine wohlgeordnete Austrägal 
Instanz zu bewirken, deren Aus-
spruch die streitenden Theile sich so-
fort zu unterwerfen haben.«
27 Austrägalordnung (June 16, 1817, 
Protokolle der Deutschen Bundes-
versammlung 1817, 35. Sitzung 
§ 231, p. 468 f.); Wiener Schlussakte 
(May 15, 1820, Protokolle der Deut-
schen Bundesversammlung 1820, 11. 
Sitzung, p. 13 f.); Exekutionsordnung 
(August 3, 1820, Protokolle der Bun-
desversammlung 1820, p. 222 f.); cf. 
Klüber (1822) 249.
28 Angelow (1996).
29 Frühauf (1976) 84.
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dispute had to be submitted for mediation to the 
Federal Convention first. Article 3 Nr. 1–11 AO 
stipulated that within four to six weeks after the 
failure of the mediation was announced to the 
Federal Convention, the defendant had to propose 
to the claimant three »neutral« members of the 
German Confederation from which the latter had 
to choose one.The court of third instance (die dritte 
oberste Justizstelle) of the chosen member state was 
then considered the Austrägal court.30 In settling 
the dispute between the member states, the court 
acted on behalf of (im Namen und anstatt) the 
Federal Convention, which had to provide the 
former with the facts of the previous mediation 
attempts. The chosen court had a »federal duty« to 
take over the case, which was to be handled 
according to the court’s ordinary rules of proce-
dure. As to the question of the substantive law to 
be applied, the Austrägal Decree remained as gen-
eral as possible and stated that the award had to be 
in accordance with the »ius commune customary 
in Germany« (in Deutschland hergebrachten gemei-
nen Rechten). The award (Erkenntniß) was to be 
given latest one year after the memorandum of the 
claimant was received (hardly any case was com-
pleted within this deadline). It was binding and 
final; remedies were rare exceptions and only 
permitted if the parties could provide the Austrägal
court with new evidence (Restitution ex capite 
novorum) within four years.31
In 1820, the ongoing debates in ministerial 
conferences and at the Frankfurt Federal Conven-
tion about a more precise definition of the relation 
between the Confederation and its member states 
were concluded in the Vienna Final Act (Wiener 
Schlussakte). Among others, its 65 Articles dealt 
with the Austrägal jurisdiction and spelt it out in 
three different types, later analysed by legal histor-
ians as: the regular Austrägalverfahren (Articles 21 
to 24 WSA), the special Austrägalverfahren (Article 
30 WSA) and the summary Austrägalverfahren (Ar-
ticles 18 to 20 WSA).
Articles 21 to 24 WSA confirmed the regular 
procedures set down in the AO. Article 23 WSA 
stipulated that, in case no special provisions are in 
force, the Austrägal court had to follow those 
»sources of law« as observed »subsidiarily by the 
former Imperial Courts« to the extent to which 
they may be applicable in current circumstances. It 
was emphasised in Article 22 WSA that once the 
Austrägal court was chosen by the parties to settle 
their dispute, neither the Federal Convention, nor 
the state government could exert any »influence« 
on this court. However, once the award was given, 
it fell to the Federal Convention to guarantee it. In 
extremis it had to execute the Austrägal award, like 
any other federal act, by force against the will of 
the recalcitrant member state in accordance with 
Articles 31–34 WSA and Articles 5 sq. Execution 
Decree (Executions-Ordnung, August 3, 1820).32
The summary (or provisionary) Austrägal proce-
dure, according to Articles 18 to 20 WSA, was to be 
read in conjunction with Article 2 of the Federal 
Act detailing the German Confederation’s purpose 
to uphold and protect the »independence and 
inviolability of the German states«. Once the »do-
mestic peace and quiet of the Confederation« was 
threatened or disturbed, the Federal Convention 
had to deliberate and take the appropriate meas-
ures to assure the »restoration« of peace. Indirectly 
referring to the Federal Act’s proscription of self-
help, this included the Confederations right to 
intervene in cases of potential or existing »assaults« 
(Thätlichkeiten) between member states. One of the 
most interesting expressions of the zeitgeist is the 
provision that the Federal Convention had »above 
all« to ensure the »maintenance of vested rights« 
(Besitzstand) (Article 19 WSA).33 In case the Fed-
eral Convention was called upon by a member 
state for the protection of its »vested rights«, and 
these rights were under dispute, the Convention 
was authorised to prompt another, disinterested 
member state »nearby the territory to be pro-
tected«, to have investigated the facts and the 
30 No »foreign institution« could be 
Austrägal-Instanz.
31 Zachariä (1845) 312; Zoepfl (1863) 
420–427.
32 Zachariä (1845) 303 f.; cf. Huber
(1953/4); Scheuner (1976) 25.
33 Cf. Hardtwig (1985) 32 referring to 
the riots of weavers in Silesia 1844: 
»Jeder Angriff auf das Privateigentum 
galt zudem in der entstehenden bür-
gerlichen Erwerbsgesellschaft 
schlechthin als Sakrileg, das hart ge-
ahndet wurde.«; more details about 
Article 19 WSA can be found in: 
Huber, Bundesexekution: 53–55.
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disturbances by its high court. Following this 
»summary investigation without delay«, the high 
court had to »issue a legal notice«. The latter’s 
execution, if refused by the state against whom it 
was issued, had to be ensured by the Federal 
Convention by those means enumerated in the 
notice (Article 20 WSA). Already in 1838 Leonhar-
di emphasised that the summary procedure for the 
maintenance of peace among the federal members 
was inherently a police measure. It served merely 
the purpose of restoring peace, not to regulate legal 
relationships among members of the German 
Confederation.34 If one of the members felt penal-
ised by the summary procedure, it was free to seek 
a more advantageous (and final) decision in a 
regular procedure according to Article 21 WSA 
and Article 3 AO. However, all of this remained 
theory.There were in fact several federal executions 
and interventions conducted by the German Con-
federation according to Articles 19 or 26; 31–34 
WSA without the prior or later involvement of 
courts, reaching in part European proportions.35
Yet, no execution was related to Article 20 WSA. 
No Austrägal award was ever issued based on its 
provisions, thus showing that the summary proce-
dure had only »limited practical relevance«.36
The Austrägal procedure, according to Article 30 
WSA, dealt with the special case of claims by 
»private individuals« (also called Diadikasie proce-
dure, following similar cases in ancient Greek law). 
They could become the basis or reason for an 
Austrägal procedure, assuming the claims were 
not met due to a controversy between several 
German states about the question as to which party 
was under an obligation to fulfil the private claim. 
In the event that they could not reach an amicable 
agreement to be mediated by a committee of the 
Federal Convention, the member states had to 
approach an Austrägal court in order to clarify 
the »preliminary question in dispute« concerning 
the capacity of a state to be sued (Passivlegitima-
tion). However, determining the party roles turned 
out to be problematic, as – given the burden of 
proof – none of the state parties wanted to act as 
plaintiff; special provisions regarding this question 
were missing. Although the determination of the 
party roles by lot had been discussed in the legal 
literature to, in practice it was often the case that 
the Austrägal court called on one party by admin-
istrative decision to provide it with a first brief and 
thus – without any prejudice to any other rights – 
to accept the role of plaintiff.37
The distinct characteristic of the special Austrä-
gal procedure was that the entire case was induced 
and executed in the interest of a private person, 
mostly commencing with a petition to the Federal 
Convention. Nevertheless, the private person was 
not party to the case. In 1822, Robert Mohl, then 
soon-to-be professor of law in Tübingen, assumed 
that considering the purpose of the German Con-
federation and the elaborateness of the law, the 
provisions on inter-government dispute settlement 
(Article 21 WSA) were »by far the most significant« 
of the German federal judiciary (Justizverfassung).38
However, it appears that 31 out of 54 Austrägal
procedures from 1815 to 1866 were procedures 
according to Article 30 WSA. The significance of 
this is, in part, explained by the fact that following 
the international reorganisations between 1806 
and 1815, private creditors often did not know 
against whom they should direct their claims, 
which originated prior to the foundation of the 
German Confederation. The disputes underlying 
all these cases concerned claims (from bonds or 
loans) against the successors of former imperial 
territories, thus the main legal question was about 
state succession.39 As a rule, creditors were mostly 
commoners, merchants or bankers. Only under 
exceptional circumstances did noblemen assert 
their claims according to Article 30 WSA, for 
example, with regard to pension entitlements or 
other capital assets that stemmed from former 
34 Leonhardi (1838) 96; cf. Scheuner
(1976) 24.
35 Hubatsch (1983) 42–43; Huber
(1953/4) 7 f., 2 f., cases of federal in-
tervention: 1. intervention in Lu-
xemburg due to the Revolution in 
Belgium 1830/31; 2. sending federal 
troops to Frankfurt due to the »Wa-
chensturm« 1833; 3. actions of the 
Confederation in Kurhesse and Hol-
stein in 1850/52. Cases of federal 
execution: 1. occupation of Holstein 
by federal troops in 1864; 2. mobili-
sation of federal troops against Prus-
sia in 1866; cf. also Stier-Somlo
(1927); Börner (1908); Pritsch
(1913).
36 Frühauf (1976) 150.
37 Klüber (1822) 256 f.; Zachariä
(1845) 315; cf. Polgar (2007) 121; 
Frühauf (1976) 140.
38 Mohl (1822) 137.
39 Scheuner (1976) 26; Bönnemann
(2007) 34; Betz (2007) I.Tabellarische 
Übersicht i–v, characterising 31 out of 
54 cases as »Diadikasieprozesse«.
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government rights of mediatised princes.40 Once 
the »preliminary question« was clarified by the 
Austrägal court – for instance, which state had to 
what extent and in what manner to fulfil the claims 
of the private person – the latter could bring suit 
for performance (Erfüllungsklage) before the com-
petent court of the member state.41
Beside these Austrägal procedures, the member 
states were, according to Article 24 WSA, frey to 
find – without the involvement of the Federal 
Convention – a »compromise«, an option that 
was often more expeditious. Yet, Austrägal courts 
could be involved in these cases as well. The 
Oberappellationsgericht Lübeck, for example, help-
ed the parties in nine cases to reach a compromise 
about disputes often concerning titles to territo-
ries.42 Furthermore, six out of the 54 formal 
Austrägal procedures commenced according to 
Article 3 AO; however, due to compromises be-
tween the state parties, they were eventually termi-
nated, i.e. were resolved without a formal award by 
one of the Austrägal courts.43
In general, politicians had high hopes in the 
Austrägal jurisdiction and its influence on German 
law and politics. Following the publication of the 
Austrägal Decree, the Prussian Chancellor, von 
Hardenberg, wrote to his Minister of Justice, von 
Kircheisen, that the future endeavours of the high-
est German courts as Austrägal-Instanz constitute »a 
challenge to … all branches of jurisprudence«.44
On the other hand, these additions to the federal 
»basic law« of 1815 were not particularly satisfying 
to those who still hoped for a genuine reform of 
the German Confederation and constitutional 
amendments that would give substance to legal 
questions, such as freedom of the press, parlia-
mentary rights or trial by jury. Instead, the laws 
of 1819/20 pointed into the opposite direction. 
Most famous are the Carlsbad Decrees, which 
banned university fraternities (Burschenschaften), 
authorised the persecution of university professors 
and expanded the censorship of the press. But the 
Vienna Final Act and the Execution Decree also 
made the constitution of the German Confedera-
tion look like an »authoritarian response to opposi-
tional challenges«. In subsequent years, opposi-
tional circles were less and less inclined to pin their 
hopes on reforms of the federal constitution. Lib-
eral critics of the current system rather focused 
their attention on the (southern German) Diets, 
venturing about challenging monarchical author-
ity and securing individual rights against ad-
ministrative encroachments. It was here, in the 
Diets, not in the courts, that during the 1820s the 
word »constitution« developed into a »polemical 
term«.45
4 In Theory. The Federal Court of Arbitration 
(Bundesschiedsgericht)
The debate about a federal high court did not 
disappear completely after 1820. As mentioned 
above, the Vienna Final Act explicitly mentioned 
the possibility that in the future the German states 
might come to an »alternative understanding« 
with regard to the Austrägal courts (Article 21 
WSA). In politics as well as in academic treatises, 
such as in Robert Mohl’s Die öffentliche Rechtspflege 
des Deutschen Bundes (1822), the »gaps … still to be 
filled in our current legislation« were candidly 
discussed.46
While a number of disputes between German 
states had already been decided by Austrägal courts, 
and others were still being negotiated in the 
Federal Convention, the governments ventured 
into finally setting up a new federal institution, a 
federal court (in 1819 a federal police commission 
had been created following the Carlsbad Decrees, 
the Central-Untersuchungs-Commission47). In 1834, 
during ministerial conferences in Vienna, a com-
mission was formed to elaborate proposals for a 
federal court. However, sceptics of central institu-
tions, again, got the upper hand and channelled 
40 Frühauf (1976) 160 f.
41 Frühauf (1976) 131–134.
42 Leonhardi (1838) 91; Polgar (2007) 
133; Frühauf (1976) 99 referring to 
the Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, 
Direktorialarchiv für die Angelegen-
heiten des Oberappellationsgerichts 
der vier Freien Städte Deutschlands, 
Rep. 22/2 VI B Nr. 4, 7–11, 13–15.
43 Frühauf (1976) 104.
44 Hardenberg to Kircheisen, 12/7/1817, 
Preuß. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Justiz-
Ministerium, Acta Generalia, Rep. 
84a, 10397, Bl. 7 zit. in: Frühauf
(1976) 83.
45 Geisthövel (2008) 16, 27 »polari-
sierende[r] Kampfbegriff«.
46 Mohl (1822) 1; cf. Eichhorn (1833) 
preface; Scheuner (1976) 23.
47 Siemann (1985); Weber (1970).
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the proposals into the direction of an arbitration 
tribunal. In the resolution of 30 October 1834, the 
Federal Convention agreed to set up in Frankfurt /
Main a Federal Court of Arbitration (Bundesschieds-
gericht). Its remit, however, should not primarily 
include the settlement of disputes between govern-
ments of the German Confederation, but rather 
disputes (Irrungen) between German governments 
and their parliaments or assemblies of the repre-
sentatives of the estates over the latter’s rights to 
participate (especially with regard to budget ap-
propriation).48 Not all German states already had a 
constitution, and there were no (constitutional) 
courts that could have decided the conflicts be-
tween governments and the estates. When an 
increasing number of such conflicts began to 
dominate the political debate and, in particular 
given the revolutionary movements that impacted 
most members of the German Confederation be-
tween 1830 and 1834 (insurrection de Francfort, 
1833), the resort to a judicial solution was consid-
ered the most convenient. Thus the ministerial 
conference in Vienna voted for the creation of a 
special »court of arbitration« (Schiedsgericht).49
However, this milestone towards a German 
constitutional court is also relevant for the ques-
tion of interstate dispute settlement. Art. 12 of the 
30 October 1834 resolution left it to the discretion 
of the member states to also allow the Federal 
Court of Arbitration to settle disputes between 
them. Thus the opportunity was given to the 
governments to settle state disputes by legal re-
course, yet without the involvement of Austrägal
courts. The latter were faced with a »real compet-
itor«; members of the German Confederation 
could choose. Nonetheless, between 1834 and 
1866 the Federal Court of Arbitration neither acted 
as a quasi-Austrägal court, nor did it decide on 
disputes between governments and estates. In this 
respect, the court had virtually no significance for 
the interstate Austrägal jurisdiction.50
The reasons for this miscalculation of the Fed-
eral Convention when setting up the court of 
arbitration are multifaceted. Most of all, referring 
a dispute to federal arbitration was not mandatory 
but merely optional (»facultativ«) for governments 
and estates. Both parties to the dispute had to agree 
to the arbitration. It follows from this that the 
estates were not entitled to unilaterally request 
federal arbitration, and state laws were never in-
troduced that declared the general competence of 
the Federal Court of Arbitration (some constitu-
tions recognised the authority of a state court 
[Staatsgerichtshof] to decide disputes about the in-
terpretation of the constitution between govern-
ment and estates).51 Additionally, the cumbersome 
formation of the court of arbitration, which meant 
no simplification in comparison to the Austrägal
jurisdiction according to the Vienna Final Act 
(1820), played a role in the court’s failure to attract 
cases: each of the 17 members of the Engere Rat, 
the most influential council of the Federal Con-
vention, had to choose two candidates every three 
years (Triennium), one of whom had to be an ex-
pert of the »juridical« and the other of the »admin-
istrative profession«. In case of a dispute, each party 
nominated from this list three arbitrators (Spruch-
männer) out of the 34 candidates (nationals of the 
parties to the case were eligible only in exceptional 
cases). Out of the remaining 28 Spruchmänner, 
the six arbitrators then chose their chairman (Ob-
mann).
The fact that the »federal arbitration remained 
theory«52 is not cause for the assumption that 
governments avoided its inception altogether. Fol-
lowing the Federal Convention’s resolution of 
48 Grimm (1988) 116–119.
49 Hardtwig (1985) 64 speaks of a »ste-
ckengebliebene Revolution« (a stall-
ed revolution); cf. Schlussprotokoll 
der Wiener Ministerial-Konferenz, 
12 June 1834, Article 3–14 on the 
court of arbitration. »Art. 4. Um das 
Schiedsgericht zu bilden, ernennt je-
de der siebzehn Stimmen des engern 
Rathes der Bundesversammlung aus 
den von ihr repräsentirten Staaten, 
von drei zu drei Jahren, zwei durch 
Charakter und Gesinnung ausge-
zeichnete Männer, welche durch 
mehrjährigen Dienst hinlängliche 
Kenntnisse und Geschäftsbildung der 
Eine im juridischen, der Andere im 
administrativen Fache erprobt haben. 
Die erfolgten Ernennungen werden 
von den einzelnen Regierungen der 
Bundesversammlung angezeigt, und 
von dieser, sobald die Anzeigen von 
allen siebzehn Stimmen eingegangen 
sind, öffentlich bekannt gemacht. 
Eben so werden die durch freiwilli-
gen Rücktritt, durch Krankheit oder 
Tod eines Spruchmannes, vor Ablauf 
der bestimmten Zeit eintretenden 
Erledigungen von den Regierungen 
für die noch übrige Dauer der drei-
jährigen Frist sofort ergänzt«; cf. 
Zoepfl (1863) 427–433.
50 Hubatsch (1983) 42; Frühauf (1976) 
156; Bönnemann (2007) 34.
51 Zachariä (1845) 335; cf. Scheuner
(1976) 4 referring to the constitutions 
of Saxony (Article 153, 1831) and 
Kurhesse (Article 120, 1852), 27.
52 Huber (1990) 624; Frühauf (1976) 
154, 157; Bönnemann (2007) 34.
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October 1834, the German governments rushed to 
inform the chancery in Frankfurt / Main about 
their two appointees for the posts of arbitrators. 
The King of Saxony, for example, had his nomi-
nations placed on record with the Federal Con-
vention just a few days later.53 It took the Saxon 
administration longer to inform the prospective 
arbitrators themselves, Dr. Schumann and Director 
von Nostitz und Jaenkendorf and their superiors in 
the Ministries of Justice and Finance.54
Even though the Federal Court of Arbitration 
never had to resolve a case, governments continued 
to appoint arbitrators throughout the epoch of the 
German Confederation. The nomination as Ger-
man federal arbitrator was an honorary position 
that did not mean relocation to Frankfurt. The 
arbitrators, according to the provisions of 1834, 
were supposed to be legal experts of the highest 
standing. When considering a number of arbitra-
tors and their careers, it can be assumed that for 
many this nomination was indeed an important 
step in the cursus honorum of German jurists in state 
employment: The above-mentioned Dr. Schu-
mann, councillor in the Saxon Ministry of Justice, 
was promoted during his tenure as arbitrator to the 
position of President of the newly founded high 
court in Dresden (Oberappellationsgericht). After 
the end of his first Triennium in 1837, both the 
King and the government in Dresden reconfirmed 
Schumann for the coming term.55 In 1836, his 
colleague from the »administrative profession«, 
von Nostitz und Jaenkendorf, had been appointed 
Saxon Minister of the Interior. He then resigned 
from his post as Spruchmann and was replaced by 
the head of district administration (Kreisdirektor) 
von Wietersheim, who in 1840 also rose to cabinet 
rank (Culture and Education).56 Likewise, other 
German governments promoted their arbitrators 
to high ranking posts during or following their 
Triennium.57
In 1838, among the 34 arbitrators, the nobility 
outbalanced the commons 19 to 15. The govern-
ments overwhelmingly observed the rule that from 
their two nominees, one had to be an expert of the 
»juridical« and the other of the »administrative 
profession«. Among the juridical experts were 
merely three professors of law (1837 Thibaut for 
Baden and Linde for Hesse; 1841 Savigny for 
Prussia); the majority consisted mainly of judges 
of appellate courts. Governments tended to reap-
point their arbitrators at the end of a Triennium. It 
was no exception that incumbents passed away as 
federal arbitrators. The longest serving federal ar-
bitrator was probably the President of the k. k. 
Appellate Court in Prague, Baron von Heß (1835 
to 1849).58
Since 1834, the constitution of the German 
Confederation was strengthened by the newly 
created Federal Court of Arbitration. Critics had 
time and again deplored that a »strong« federal 
jurisdiction was missing in the German political 
system.59 However, the innovation of 1834 re-
mained a notional achievement. The state govern-
ments remained united in their efforts not to bring 
the Court of Arbitration into existence; since both 
parties involved in a dispute had to consent to its 
competence, they found it easy to fulfil liberal 
demands on paper and to continue with traditional 
policies that upheld the »Metternich system«. After 
all, the same resolution that in 1834 set-up the 
Court of Arbitration stipulated – again – unmis-
takably that the separation of powers »is irrecon-
cilable with the constitutional law of the States 
united in the German Confederation and cannot 
be employed in any German constitution«.60 Al-
ready Article 57 WSA (1820) had set the limits for 
53 Protokoll der Bundesversammlung, 
42. Sitzung 4.11.1834 § 592: 1047.
54 SHStA 30363, MAAA Nr. 846: 2,
Saxon MFA to Saxon MoJ; MoF, 
30.11.1834.
55 SHStA 30363, MAAA Nr. 846: 11, 
Saxon MFA to v. Manteuffel, 
7.10.1837; Resolution, 30.9.1837.
56 Protokoll der Bundesversammlung, 
15. Sitzung 28.7.1836 § 216; 2. Sitzg. 
21.1.1841 § 26.
57 Protokoll der Bundesversammlung, 
4. Sitzung 5.5.1836 § 96.
58 Protokoll der Bundesversammlung, 
8. Sitzg. 17.5.1838 § 106, Beil. 1, S. 
321; 35, 6. Sitzg. 13.3.1841 § 87, Beil. 
3, S. 147; 64, 6. Sitzg. 4.3.1847 § 66, 
Beil., S. 155.
59 Mohl (1822) 219.
60 Schlussprotokoll der Wiener Minis-
terial-Konferenz, June 12, 1834, Arti-
cle 1 »Jede demselben [Grundprinzip 
des deutschen Bundes, gemäß wel-
chem die gesammte Staatsgewalt in 
dem Oberhaupte des Staats vereinigt 
bleiben muß] widerstrebende, auf ei-
ne Theilung der Staatsgewalt abzie-
lende Behauptung ist unvereinbar 
mit dem Staatsrechte der im deut-
schen Bunde vereinigten Staaten, und 
kann bei keiner deutschenVerfassung 
in Anwendung kommen«; cf. 
Hegewisch (2016).
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any constitutional development: Since the German 
Princes were »sovereign«, the »entire state author-
ity [Staats-Gewalt] must remain united in the head 
of state«.61
5 The Chosen Few. The Austrägal Courts
Despite its reputation as an illiberal – not to say 
repressive or reactionary – institution, the German 
Confederation is nowadays also remembered by 
historians for its »contribution to peace-keeping« 
in Europe.62 In fact, it is impossible to assess – both 
in retrospect and contrary to fact – which matters 
of dispute might have led to the use of force 
between German states had there not been the 
Austrägal courts or other means of compromise. 
But it seems fair to assume that the dispute settle-
ment mechanisms practised in the Federal Con-
vention were among the more relevant means 
available for »peace-keeping«.
As we have seen, the course of the Austrägal
procedure was fairly regulated. According to fed-
eral laws (Article 1 AO; Article 21 WSA), it was 
divided into two main parts: 1. the mediation 
proceedings by the Federal Convention (subdi-
vided into introductory proceedings; election and 
proceedings of the mediation committee; election 
of the Austrägal court) and 2. the Austrägal proce-
dure proper. Since both parties were convinced of 
the superiority of their legal positions, the media-
tion proceedings were often abbreviated in order to 
elect the Austrägal court as soon as possible by 
nomination of the defendant and choice of the 
plaintiff (Article 2 II AO). If the parties could not 
agree, the right of proposal went from the defend-
ant to the Federal Convention. The court of third 
instance of the chosen member state was there-
upon informed by the Federal Convention about 
the case. No Austrägal court ever shirked its federal 
duty, which was seen as an honourable task under-
lining the importance and reputation of the court 
and its judges.63 As an organisational consequence 
of the federal provisions, member states that had 
not yet installed a court of third instance erected 
their Obertribunale or Oberappellationsgerichte. In 
some of these courts the rules of court procedure 
(Gerichtsordnung) explicitly referenced the Austrä-
gal competences according to federal law. Since 
1838 the larger appellate courts, having several 
senates (Celle, Munich, Vienna), set-up special 
Austrägalsenate with at least 13 judges; previously, 
the courts followed the rule that they had to sit in 
full court (in pleno) for Austrägal cases. Despite 
changes to the procedural rules, the Appellate 
Court Celle (having three Austrägalsenate) com-
plained about an overload of work due to its 
Austrägal jurisdiction. From the merely seven 
members of the Oberappellationsgericht Lübeck, 
such complaints were never mentioned. In addi-
tion to their ordinary court cases, both courts 
handled the bulk of all Austrägal cases (Celle 14 
cases, Lübeck 6). Between 1815 and 1866, 10 out of 
19 (or later 25) German courts of third instance 
handled altogether 54 Austrägal cases.64
In retrospect, is difficult to assess why nine out 
of 19 courts of third instance were never chosen by 
the parties to act as their Austrägal court. Six 
further courts were only elected once, while merely 
four courts handled more than one case (Celle, 
Lübeck, Jena and Mannheim). The reputation of 
the courts, as difficult as this is to measure, seems to 
be one of the main causes of this imbalance. The 
Oberappellationsgericht Celle, created in 1711 and 
thus one of the oldest state appellate courts in the 
Holy Roman Empire, was held in high esteem for 
its well-founded decisions. Until 1848, the judges, 
who were divided into one »noble« and one »com-
moner bar«, had to pass special entrance exams. 
The personal union of Hanover (a German »mid-
61 Article 57 WSA »Da der deutsche 
Bund, mit Ausnahme der freien 
Städte, aus souverainen Fürsten be-
steht, so muß dem hierdurch gege-
benen Grundbegriffe zufolge die ge-
sammte Staats-Gewalt in dem Ober-
haupte des Staats vereinigt bleiben, 
und der Souverain kann durch eine 
landständische Verfassung nur in der 
Ausübung bestimmter Rechte an die 
Mitwirkung der Stände gebunden 
werden.«; cf. Welsing (2016).
62 Müller (2006) 53 f.
63 Frühauf (1976) 107; Zachariä
(1845) 306.
64 Courts of third instance in the Ger-
man Confederation giving an Austrä-
gal award: Oberappellationsgericht in 
Celle für das Königreich Hannover 
(14 awards); Oberappellationsgericht 
in Lübeck für die vier Freien Städte 
(6 awards); Oberappellationsgericht 
in Jena für die Thüringischen Staaten 
(5 awards); Oberhofgericht in Mann-
heim für Baden (4 awards); Oberster 
Gerichtshof in Wien für Österreich 
(1 award); Geheimes Obertribunal in 
Berlin für Preußen (1 award); Ober-
appellationsgericht in München für 
Bayern (1 award); Oberappellations-
gericht in Dresden (1 award); Ober-
tribunal in Stuttgart für Würtemberg 
(1 award); Oberappellationsgericht in 
Darmstadt für Hessen-Darmstadt 
(1 award); Frühauf (1976) 88 f. refers 
to the Oberappellationsgericht Lübeck.
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dle-state« with no aspirations for predominance) 
with Great Britain was apparently an indicator for 
the independence of the judiciary and respect for 
the law, both enshrined in a pioneering Oberap-
pellations-Gerichts-Ordnung.65 Furthermore, the 
successful handling of early Austrägal cases sug-
gested to subsequent parties (or instead the Federal 
Convention) that in Celle their case would be in 
verifiably competent hands.66 The Oberappella-
tionsgericht Lübeck did not have the ›historical‹ 
argument at its disposal. Founded only in 1820 as 
the highest appellate court for the four German 
»Republics«, the free cities Hamburg, Lübeck, Bre-
men and Frankfurt / Main, it was first chosen to 
serve as an Austrägal court in 1827. The »popular-
ity« of this court, emphasised by several legal 
historians, was most of all due to its »outstanding 
judgements«. The judges in Lübeck (as well as 
those in Celle or Jena) were considered to be 
among the most capable jurists in Germany; aca-
demic authorities, such as Windscheid, Jhering or 
Savigny, confirmed this time and again. The rela-
tively speedy course of the cases (on average a 
duration of three years in Lübeck compared to 
almost 10 years in Celle) also spoke in favour of the 
judges in Lübeck. Moreover, the republican con-
stitution of the Lübeck court circuit contributed a 
sense of judicial independence among prospective 
parties.67
Taken together, the fact that around 80 per cent 
of the Austrägal awards were given by only four 
courts out of potentially 19 (or 25) had – if not a 
unifying influence – a diminishing effect on ten-
dencies of inconsistent adjudication between the 
courts. Lacking a permanent Austrägal institution 
or central federal court and given the courts’ differ-
ent rules of procedures, the risk of discrepancies 
between awards was real, since rules of procedure 
could influence the interpretation of substantive 
law. Thus, the development of a unified set of 
›Austrägal-case-law‹ rules was – for the time being 
– nothing more than a mere idea. The age of legal 
periodicals was only beginning,68 and it was thus 
not always clear whether the different Austrägal
judges took note of previous awards by other 
Austrägal courts. Therefore, questions about the 
predictability of legal decisions could be realisti-
cally answered only for individual Austrägal courts, 
not for the German Austrägal jurisdiction in gen-
eral. However, it is said that Austrägal awards 
inconsistent with one another or differing legal 
interpretation were »very rare«. Such inconsisten-
cies could not diminish the authority of the courts 
and the »trust placed in them« to adjudicate 
justly.69
The question according to what laws Austrägal
awards should be given, is not necessarily related to 
›cultural differences‹ between parties that some-
times play an important role in international 
arbitration cases. After all, Article 3 Nr. 7 AO 
stipulated that the award had to be in accordance 
with the »ius commune customary in Germany« 
(in Deutschland hergebrachten gemeinen Rechten). 
However, the question was relevant enough for 
conflicting parties to choose (or not to choose) a 
specific court according to the procedural or sub-
stantive law it applied. For example, the Berlin 
Rheinische Revisions- und Kassationshof, which since 
1819 served as the court of third instance for 
disputes in Prussia’s territories east of the River 
Rhine (where after 1815 French-Rhenanian law 
was also applied),70 was considered by most mem-
ber states as ineligible. Prussia’s Foreign Minister 
knew that these concerns would only give way 
once it was made clear that the Rheinische Revisions- 
und Kassationshof would decide Austrägal cases 
according to German common law and would 
disregard the French-Rhenanian court rules.71
6 Can the Austrägal Court Decide?
On the Justiciability of Political Questions
The question what matters of ›state life‹, sover-
eignty or politics could and should be settled by 
court procedure is an ancient one. German legal 
history provides ample examples not only of dis-
cussions about this question, but also of concrete 
65 Hagemann (1819).
66 Landwehr (2011) 24; Stein (1950) 
63 f.
67 Polgar (2007)15, 17, 97; Frühauf
(1976) 116, 161.
68 Cf. Stolleis / Simon (2006); Stolleis
(1999).
69 Frühauf (1976) 161; cf. Klüber
(1822) 253.
70 Seynsche (2003); Geyer (2009); 
Zachariä (1845) 309 f.
71 Frühauf (1976) 93.
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legal cases that dealt with fundamental questions 
concerning the political order. Going back to the 
Middle Ages, the legal historian Heinrich Mitteis 
had already christened this phenomenon ›Politische 
Prozesse‹ back in 1927 and regarded these as the 
early roots of constitutional jurisdiction.72
The ›old‹ Imperial Austrägal jurisdiction was 
recurrently faced with the problem of defining 
limits between political and legal disputes. This 
distinction was also made during the negotiations 
concerning the Federal Act in Vienna. When dis-
cussing a future federal court, Prussia’s commis-
sioner explained that its competence would in-
clude only »legal questions« (Rechtsfragen), whereas 
the Federal Convention should decide on issues 
not related to legal questions. Two years later, the 
state representatives in Frankfurt preparing the 
Austrägal Decree (1817) were aware of the defini-
tional challenges of – to use a modern term – 
justiciability. Prussia, but also Hesse, suggested that 
not all disputes referred to the Federal Convention 
according to Article 11 Federal Act would be 
suitable for an Austrägal court. Others, especially 
those who were eager to avoid a future central 
Federal Court, tried to argue against a special 
provision for »political questions«. They emphas-
ised that it would be impossible for the Federal 
Convention to make such distinctions. The Saxon 
envoy underlined that all disputes could be 
brought before an Austrägal court since legal and 
political matters were too closely intertwined to 
clearly separate them or to determine which of the 
two would outbalance the other. Moreover, the 
envoy of Baden focused on the practicability-argu-
ment, pointing out that a »new distinction« would 
cause great difficulties for the Federal Convention: 
»It is an invidious task … to find the limit« 
(Gränzscheide). Even though the differentiation 
between legal questions suitable for court decisions 
– in contrast to matters to be left for political 
negotiations and mediation – did not find its way 
into the decree’s text, the question remained rele-
vant for German interstate disputes.73
Among academic jurists, questions about the 
justiciability of political disputes developed into 
one of »the most extensively dealt with problems 
of the judiciary of the German Confederation«.74
Contemporary constitutional jurisprudence in-
quired as to whom the competence belonged 
primarily when settling disputes between mem-
bers of the Confederation, to the Federal Conven-
tion or to the Austrägal courts? While some aca-
demic jurists attempted to delimit disputes based 
on their causes, in the end they were unable to 
generate more clarity than their counterparts in 
politics or administration. Disputes between mem-
bers of the Confederation to be settled according to 
Article 11 of the Federal Act were differentiated 
into »matters of law« (Justizsachen) and »non-mat-
ters of law« (Nichtjustizsachen). Others, such as the 
above quoted Friedrich Wilhelm von Leonhardi, 
asked whether federal members were in dispute 
about rights and obligations originating in the 
Federal Act as a German quasi-constitution, or 
whether they opposed each other as sovereigns – 
without regard to the federal constitution. How-
ever, Leonhardi emphasised that »currently« feder-
al law did not distinguish the »nature« of disputes, 
rather it included all disagreements »(be they law, 
politics, or interest [related disputes]), as long as 
they relate to the infringement of rights« (verletzte 
Rechte).75 August Wilhelm Heffter, professor of 
law at the University of Berlin, distinguished be-
tween disputes based on the federal constitution 
and those pitting two or more sovereigns against 
each other. For them, it followed that in the first 
case, the Federal Convention should be exclusively 
in charge of the dispute settlement. According to 
the federal constitution, it was the highest ranking 
body representing the »common will of the Con-
federation« (Bundesgesamtwillen) that should also 
decide the dispute. If, however, the dispute was not 
related to rights or obligations originating in the 
constitution and all attempts at mediation failed, 
an Austrägal court was to be called upon. The state 
parties to such disputes, more or less, resembled 
72 Mitteis (1927); cf. Enzmann (2009) 
102.
73 Cf. Eichhorn (1833) 8, 17, 21; Bun-
desversammlung, Protokoll 
29.5.1817 § 196: 80, cf. Bönnemann
(2007) 31.
74 Frühauf (1976) 95 f.; cf. Huber
(1990) 628; Betz (2007) 62.
75 Leonhardi (1838) 92, 95; cf. also 
Zachariä (1845) 291; 294 rejecting 
the distinction between »disputes in 
rights and disputes in interests (zwi-
schen Rechts- und Interessen-Streitigkei-
ten der Bundesglieder)« and doubting 
the possibility of drawing a line 
(»Gränzlinie«) between legal and po-




parties in a civil procedure arguing in front of an 
ordinary court. Cases regarding claims of German 
princes against each other based on international 
law, claims of one German sovereign against the 
territories or properties of another or purely private 
claims of a sovereign (e. g. due to insults) were 
given as examples for such disputes »independent 
of the Confederation«.76
However, the majority of authors followed 
Leonhardi’s understanding that the law did not 
distinguish between political and legal disputes 
amongst German governments. From this it fol-
lowed that in every case – after mediation failed – 
an Austrägal court had to be set-up. Justiciability 
was not a matter of choice for the state parties. 
Until the very end of the German Confederation, 
this opinion was justified by reference to the text of 
Article 11 of the Federal Act (»and thus a judicial 
decision becomes necessary«), and the function of 
the Austrägal jurisdiction as surrogate of the Ger-
man Federal Court declined during the Vienna 
Congress.77 Without questioning the sovereignty 
of the members of the Confederation, when in 
doubt, these authors gave priority to maintaining 
peace among the German states by court decisions. 
Legal historian Ernst Rudolf Huber recognised 
that the »guarantee of peace [the purpose of the 
Confederation according to the Federal Act] stood 
higher than the guarantee of sovereignty«.78
Soon after the debates in Vienna and Frankfurt, 
the justiciability of disputes between members of 
the German Confederation became practically rel-
evant during a dispute between Anhalt-Köthen and 
Prussia. From 1820 onwards both governments 
disagreed about the transit and consumption tax 
levied by Prussia along the River Elbe.The Prussian 
government stayed faithful to its argumentation in 
Vienna that not all disputes between member 
states could be decided by means of the courts. 
In these cases the Federal Convention should limit 
its efforts to mediation. There were rights, e.g. 
private claims of states against each other, or 
political interests, e.g. disputes about administra-
tive or constitutional competences, which could – 
if at all – only be determined according to domes-
tic state or international law and had nothing to do 
with Austrägal jurisdiction. While Prussia main-
tained that only mediation attempts should be 
permitted, the majority in the Federal Convention 
pointed out that, according to the provisions of the 
Federal Act, all disputes between federal members 
must be resolved by judicial decision if mediation 
failed. They, thus, also insisted that maintaining 
peace among member states by means of legal 
dispute settlement had priority over Prussia’s 
claims to sovereignty. Even though Prussia’s repre-
sentative could not convince his colleagues in the 
Federal Convention, Prussia nevertheless got what 
it wanted: the dispute with Anhalt-Köthen never 
reached an Austrägal court, but was settled in 1828 
between the parties by means of a compromise 
arranged by the Federal Convention. As we have 
seen, even the majority of legal literature argued 
against Prussia’s stand. Still, in 1830, Prussia raised 
similar arguments by distinguishing between po-
litical interests and legal questions during a dispute 
between Braunschweig and Lippe. This time the 
Federal Convention referred the matter to an 
Austrägal court.79
However, there were indeed decisions of the 
Federal Convention according to which the Aus-
trägal jurisdiction was incompetent to decide, irre-
spective of the fact that two German states were in 
dispute and one party asked for settlement. In a 
dispute between Kurhesse (Hesse Kassel) and Wal-
deck, the government of Kurhesse claimed the 
continuing liege lordship (Lehnsherrlichkeit) over 
the principality of Waldeck. On 20 January 1848, 
the Federal Convention rejected Waldeck’s request 
for an Austrägal procedure, »because the subject of 
the dispute touches upon the foundation of the 
constitution of the German Confederation and, 
therefore, a court cannot be competent« (unterfalle 
nicht der Zuständigkeit).80
In general, Austrägal courts had – once charged 
by the Federal Convention to settle the interstate 
dispute – no reason to doubt their own compe-
tence to decide the case. However, this did not stop 
76 Heffter (1829) 182.
77 Zoepfl (1863) 408–410; cf. Betz
(2007) 62; Bönnemann (2007) 41,
referring to Arnold: 6; Brunquell I: 
303ff.; Heffter: 184 f.; Maurenbre-
cher: 187 f.; Zachariae II: 736 f.; 
Eichhorn: 12.
78 Huber (1990) 629; Frühauf (1976) 
97.
79 Frühauf (1976) 97; Bönnemann
(2007) 30.
80 Protokolle der Bundesversammlung 
1848 III § 43: 70, cf. Zoepfl (1863) 
418 f.; Frühauf (1976) 117.
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the parties from repeatedly arguing in their mem-
oranda and during the hearings that the court 
lacked competence. Yet, each time their objection 
was rejected.81
7 How? And How Relevant? The Practice of 
German Austrägal Jurisdiction
How did the parties organise their Austrägal
cases? And what causes gave rise to an Austrägal
case in the first place? In most of the 54 cases 
(1815–1866), the territorial changes between 1795 
and 1815 played a decisive role. Member states 
could not agree how to define the legal succession 
with respect to the obligations of the territory in 
question. Only two disputes originated from the 
time of the German Confederation. For example, 
in 1832 the states Hanover, Oldenburg, Braun-
schweig, Nassau as well as the free cities Bremen 
and Frankfurt brought an action against Kur-
hesse, which had – contrary to previous agreements 
(Mitteldeutscher Handelsverein) – entered into a cus-
toms union with Prussia. The Austrägal case was 
dealt with by the High Court in Vienna, but was 
not decided until 1866. The organisation of the 
German Customs Union in 1833 made the case 
obsolete. In 28 of the 54 cases, only two states were 
litigants; in one case, 15 states were involved. On 
average three to four states were involved in each 
case.82
Considering the dominance of disputes about 
territorial changes after 1795, it is understandable 
that most Austrägal cases were conducted by those 
German states that were deeply affected by these 
changes: Kurhesse (24 times party to a case), 
Prussia (24), Nassau (23), Bavaria (21), Hesse-
Darmstadt (13) and Baden (11). Austria, on the 
other hand, the presiding and most powerful state 
of the German Confederation, was more hesitant 
to use the Austrägal jurisdiction. It was party to a 
case only four times, and of these cases, three were 
related to Austria as a successor state of territories 
along the River Rhine. While Bremen, Lübeck, 
Hamburg, Lichtenstein and Holstein-Lauenburg 
(having the King of Denmark as sovereign) were 
never involved in an Austrägal case, all other states 
were party to at least one.83
The matters in dispute were overwhelmingly of 
»modest constitutional relevance« or, as one legal 
historian put it, »politically not essential«. They 
concerned above all pension benefits, endow-
ments, custom disputes, border conflicts, contro-
versies over successions with regard to the states 
liquidated in or before 1815 or disputes over rights 
of inheritance. As the average duration of Austrägal
proceedings of 11 years (5 years mediation at-
tempts at the Federal Convention; six years court 
proceedings) indicates, the matters in dispute were 
often extremely complex and required masses of 
documents to be sent back and forth across Ger-
many (in horse carriages). The longest court pro-
ceeding lasted 16 years; three cases were not termi-
nated until 1866. In general, most cases (33) were 
brought before an Austrägal court between 1815 
and 1830; after 1850 only nine new interstate 
disputes were referred to court.84 It seems indeed 
that after the revolution 1848, the Austrägal juris-
diction was losing in practical relevance for the 
German governments to solve their disputes. Au-
thors believing in the progress of (the Confeder-
ation’s) law (civil servants among them) may still 
have hoped that someday (soon) there will be »a 
complete and definite regulation of the [Confed-
erations’] dispute settlement«.85 However, newly 
arisen debates in the Federal Convention about 
finally creating a Bundesgericht got bogged down 
until 1866.86
How was an Austrägal case conducted in a 
practical sense? Evidently, it is impossible here to 
summate 54 cases over a time span of 51 years 
beyond providing some statistics, such as those 
81 Bönnemann (2007) 32 f.; cf. e. g. 
Thüringisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, 
Weimar (THStA) Eisenacher Archiv, 
Hoheitssachen 1431: 36–65 (39), 
Dr. Müller, Grundriß verschiedener 
Verteidigungsmomente, 8.6.1834; 
92, Dr. Müller to Dr. Schweitzer, 
Staatsministerium, 24.6.1834.
82 Frühauf (1976) 160; Stein (1950) 61; 
cf. Betz (2007) 61, annex I (table of 
cases).
83 Stein (1950) 57 f., 60.
84 Bönnemann (2007) 54; Betz (2007) 
56, 60; Frühauf (1976) 126.
85 Reichard (1844) 557.
86 SHStA 10718, Nr. 17 Entwurf des 
Vortrages des Bundestags-Ausschusses 
eines Bundesgerichtes, vorgelegt 
23.1.1860, Dr. von Linde.
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given above. It seems thus justified to point to a 
few archival impressions about the inception of 
one single Austrägal case in order to gain a notion 
of the legal questions under dispute and the lan-
guage in which these were dealt with.This can help 
to better understand the everyday complexities of 
the Austrägal jurisdiction, while still acknowledg-
ing that the personnel of other cases may have had 
different experiences.
A conflict had been smouldered between Kur-
hesse and Saxon-Weimar-Eisenach since 1816. The 
conflict involved the sequestration of revenues 
connected with a religious donation (based in 
Fulda) that had properties in theThuringian Grand 
Duchy. Kurhesse commenced the procedure in 
1820 by petitioning the Federal Convention. At-
tempts at mediation were undertaken in Frankfurt. 
Their failure had to be officially conceded by the 
Federal Convention, and a statement was made 
that a formal Austrägal procedure was to be 
opened. Members of the Confederation (that is, 
their courts of third instance) were named as 
potential Austrägal judges, and the high court in 
Celle was chosen in mid-1832 by the parties. In 
July 1832, the Federal Convention informed the 
high court about its newest appointment as Aus-
trägal court (its seventh appointment) to decide 
the dispute about the sequestrated revenues of 
the Fulda donation on Saxon-Weimar territory. 
Kurhesse as Imploranten »requested the reestablish-
ment of the status quo p. p. ut intus«. In March 1833 
the court asked the parties to each nominate an 
attorney from the Prokuratoren admitted in Celle. 
In November the attorney of Kurhesse, Bethe, 
provided the court with a 20-page legal analysis 
of the facts plus evidence »in attachment«. This 
memorandum explained the factual history of the 
liquidation and »dismemberment« (Zerstückelung) 
of the Grand Duchy of Frankfurt (1810–1813), 
including the »city and department of Fulda« by 
Prussia, Kurhesse, Saxon-Weimar and Bavaria (like-
wise sued by Kurhesse). Bethe also laid out a 
number of legal arguments mainly referring to 
the Vienna Congress Act (Articles 37 to 40) and 
the complaints of Kurhesse in the Federal Con-
vention. Once the »State-Ministry« in Weimar was 
provided with this memorandum that confronted 
their government with a claim of compensation 
for lost profit, the councillors prepared files with 
counter-arguments to »instruct« Weimar’s attorney 
– who was not yet chosen. The judges of the Ober-
Appellationsgericht Jena (currently Austrägal judges 
in two parallel cases) were requested to submit 
an expert report. They remained involved and 
supported their government against Kurhesse 
throughout the proceedings. It was the Jena high 
court judge Dr. Ernst Müller who instructed Wei-
mar’s newly appointed attorney, the Prokurator
Schwarz (chosen in March 1834) about the »points 
of defence« in the case.87
The high court in Celle, aware that the case had 
been going on now for more than a year (the 
deadline set to hand down the award in Article 3 
no. 8 AO), pushed the Weimar government in 
April 1834 to provide it with its counter-memo-
randum by 26 May 1834. However, considering the 
cumbersome procurement of documents and, 
most of all, the postal connections between Wei-
mar and Celle (not to mention Jena), this deadline 
was clearly not going to be met. Judge Dr. Müller, 
assigned to provide attorney Schwarz with the 
main arguments, complained »this is indeed im-
possible«.88 The deadline was extended until June 
of the same year. In May, Schwarz sent a first draft 
of his memorandum to the councillors in Weimar 
for further discussion. He commenced with the 
self-confident statement that the »competence of 
the Federal Convention in the current issue … to 
mandate an Austrägalinstanz … is highly dubita-
ble.« His »competency-question« led him to argue 
that »from a legal point of view this dispute does 
not involve members of the Confederation, but 
rights of persons, individual citizens, or certain 
donations …«. Next to the »incompetence of the 
Austrägal court«, Schwarz objected to the plaintiff’s 
right to sue (Aktiv-Legitimation). »Religious and 
secular donations (Stiftungen) do not belong to 
the state property; according to Article 65 Reichs-
87 THStA Eisenacher Archiv, Hoheits-
sachen 1431: 1, 14, 19, Staatsminis-
terium Weimar an Oberappellations-
gerichtsrat Dr. Müller, Jena, 24.12.
1833, 25.3., 29.4.1834; on the role of 
the court in Jena as Thuringian arbit-
ration tribunal cf. Klüber (1822) 248.
88 THStA Eisenacher Archiv, Hoheits-
sachen 1431: 10, Vollmacht, Dr. iur. 
Johann G. Behte, Celle 31.10.1834; 
20, Schwarz to Staatministerium 
Weimar, 28.4.; Dr. Müller to Staats-
ministerium, 4.5.1834.
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deputationshauptschluss [1803], they are to be con-
served like any other private property. If revenues 
and interests … due to these donations were 
sequestered, only the directly affected private per-
son is impaired, and only this person is authorised 
to ask for judicial intervention in the matter. The 
protection of the rights of its subjects afforded by 
any government does not entitle the latter to make 
their private affair a state affair (Staats-Sache), and 
to appoint oneself as party in the matter.« And 
finally, Schwarz argued factually by raising the 
rhetorical question: »How can the electoral [kur-
fürstliche] government justifiably characterise a 
procedure [the sequestration] as unlawful given 
that it itself apparently embraced and thus ap-
proved and considered it appropriate?« (Fulda 
belonged to Frankfurt until 1813, and parts of 
the Duchy of Frankfurt were incorporated into 
Kurhesse after 1815).89
After he read Schwarz’s note, judge Müller also 
wrote a memorandum (60 pages) against the 
Kurhesse’s case and attached 26 documents as 
proof of the righteousness of Saxon-Weimar’s gov-
ernment. He devoted a great deal of attention to 
Schwarz’s question about the Austrägal court’s 
incompetence. He referred to the »fact« that the 
sequestrated objects were – in part – never matters 
of international treaties (Staatsverträge), and there-
fore they could not be the cause of an interstate 
dispute.The »Austrägal procedure in question is on 
no account justified and admissible (begründet und 
zulässig)«.90 Later, Müller even quoted a recent 
precedent of one party’s »objection to an incom-
petent [Austrägal] court« in the parallel procedure 
of Prussia against (among others) Saxon-Weimar 
about the obligations of repayment of loans by the 
Preußische Seehandlung company. In this case as 
well, the high court in Celle was in charge, and it 
required the opponents to explicitly respond in 
their memoranda to this objection.91
Schwarz and Müller’s strategy did not bear fruit. 
In an advanced notice in late 1834, the Austrägal
court declared »on behalf of the Federal Conven-
tion« that it neither recognised their objection of 
its »incompetence« nor the objection to the plain-
tiff’s right to sue. The Kurhesse government had 
»sued [the other governments] in its capacity as the 
highest state authority by virtue of its sovereignty« 
and not as a mere »representative« of private 
interests (the Fulda donations).92 While the case 
continued, we do not know anything about the 
court’s internal debates and its communications; 
Celle’s archives were lost in World War II.93
Indicating the depth of the legal argumentation, 
the few impressions of an Austrägal case we do have 
must suffice. In part, Saxon-Weimar released Fulda 
property in late 1835;94 however, only in 1843 was 
the final award given by the high court in Celle, 
rejecting Kurhesse’s claims and ordering the claim-
ant to pay the costs.95 It was quite common that 
the awards were carefully drafted, especially con-
sidering the facts and the laws in question.96
Once the award was given by an Austrägal court, 
it was, as mentioned above, final and binding. 
Further legal avenues were excluded – lest the 
parties could provide the same Austrägal court with 
new evidence within four years (Restitution ex 
capite novorum, Article 3 no. 9 AO). In the 1830s, 
the admission of plea in nullity (Nichtigkeitsbe-
schwerde) was debated, but no formal statute to 
that effect was ever stipulated by the Federal Con-
vention. This (reform) debate might be read as yet 
another expression of the notion of perfectibility of 
the Confederation’s law and its institutions. But, 
again, the concerns were too great that it all might 
end in one central federal court placed at the top of 
89 THStA Eisenacher Archiv, Hoheits-
sachen 1431: 26, Staatsministerium 
Weimar to Dr. Müller, 16.5.1834; 
27–34, Schwarz, Rechts-Gutachten, 
Celle, 30.4.1834.
90 THStA Eisenacher Archiv, Hoheits-
sachen 1431: 36–65 (39), Dr. Müller, 
Grundriß verschiedener Verteidi-
gungsmomente, 8.6.1834; 92, Dr. 
Müller to Dr. Schweitzer, Staatsmi-
nisterium, 24.6.1834.
91 THStA Eisenacher Archiv, Hoheits-
sachen 1431: 75, Schwarz to Staats-
Ministerium, 15.6.1834.
92 THStA Eisenacher Archiv, Hoheits-
sachen 1431: 102, Prot. Bundesver-
sammlung, 1. Sitzg. 3.1.1835 §: 3.
93 Frühauf (1976) 4.
94 THStA Eisenacher Archiv, Hoheits-
sachen 1431: 107, Rescript Carl 
Friedrich, Weimar, 11.12.1835; 119, 
Carl Friedrich, 17.3.1837.
95 THStA Eisenacher Archiv, Hoheits-
sachen 1431: 127, Decret Oberapl.
gericht Celle, 10.10.1836; Beischeid, 
14.3.1837; Betz (2007) Tabellarische 
Übersicht I, No. 30.
96 Bönnemann (2007) 30.
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a court hierarchy, thereby relegating state courts to 
the second rank: an idea not compatible with state 
sovereignty. Thus, the rules set-up on the Austrägal
procedure following the Congress of Vienna con-
tinued to remain more or less unaltered.97
8 Austrägal Jurisdiction and War.
The Austro-Prussian Dispute 1866
It seems noteworthy that in all Austrägal cases, 
the governments ›defeated‹ in the procedure ac-
cepted the award without delay, as required in 
Article 11 Federal Act. This is all the more remark-
able because there were occasions when larger 
powers stood against small states in an Austrägal
procedure. The question whether the former 
avoided using their political influence to put pres-
sure on their smaller adversaries before and during 
the procedure cannot be answered here (if at all – 
for this depends on the available sources). How-
ever, even Prussia’s government, once it could not 
convince the Federal Convention of its opinion 
that certain disputes putting political questions in 
the forefront were not justiciable, accepted the 
majority’s viewpoint as obligatory98 – as long as 
the subjects under dispute were not considered 
vital. The Austrägal courts successfully solved the 
legal questions put before them. In this respect, 
contemporaries understandably emphasised »how 
important and beneficial for Germany’s internal 
peace (Ruhe) [the provision of] Article 11 of the 
Federal Act« was.99
The limits of the concept of Austrägal jurisdic-
tion were reached when legal questions and polit-
ical interests intersected. Prussia’s two rather mi-
nor disputes during the 1820s and 30s, when it 
invoked a self-declared, but poorly explained »po-
litical question« doctrine, pointed towards the 
underlying challenge that the execution of legal 
decisions depended on good will – most of all on 
the good will of the stronger party. Disputes with 
Anhalt-Köthen about transit taxes may have in-
volved political questions, but did not call into 
question the Austrägal jurisdiction or the German 
Confederation in its entirety.
The connection between the federal judiciary, as 
represented by the Austrägal jurisdiction, and fed-
eral (military) intervention was not only evident in 
the respective laws enacted since 1817 but most of 
all in the Vienna Final Act (WSA), which united in 
one text the application of law and the application 
of force. Also the political situation in several 
German states since the 1850s reminded observers 
that there were in fact political questions and 
disputes that the parties were unwilling to settle 
by law and, therefore, (military) force was decisive. 
In 1850, during the constitutional conflict and the 
federal intervention in Kurhesse (disputable ac-
cording to the provisions of the Vienna Final 
Act), at one point, Bavarian and Austrian troops 
fired at Prussian troops (skirmish at Bronnzell). In 
1866 the Austrian-Prussian conflict escalated even 
further. Legally speaking, the basic laws of the 
German Confederation stood at the heart of the 
dispute about the territories of Schleswig and 
Holstein, jointly administered by both powers. 
Prussia’s Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, made 
clear that his government did not attach great 
value to the »federal bond«, and that he saw 
Prussia’s relations with Austria no differently than 
with any other European power. Prussia and Aus-
tria never had a dispute settled by Austrägal proce-
dure. And Bismarck had no intention of putting 
the political question of Schleswig and Holstein 
before the Federal Convention, with the aim to ask 
an Austrägal court to decide the matter. He saw the 
question purely in terms of international law and 
Prussia’s ius ad bellum. The Austrian government, 
on the other hand, insisted on the obligatory 
nature of the »permanent« (beständig) Confedera-
tion (Article 1 Federal Act, 1815) and wanted to 
solve the matter according to its legal provisions 
for federal dispute settlement. The subsequent 
debates in the Federal Convention centred on the 
applicability of the summary Austrägal procedure 
97 THStA A 8048: 1–10, Report on ad-
mission of Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde in 
Austrägal procedures, Oberappella-
tionsgericht Jena to Duke Saxon-
Coburg-Gotha, 16.10.1834 [recom-
mending not to add to the Restitu-
tion ex capite novorum]; Frühauf
(1976) 129; Bönnemann (2007) 29.
98 Frühauf (1976) 160.
99 Reichard (1844) 556; cf. Zoepfl
(1863) 456 f. characterising the Ger-
man Confederation as a »Landfrie-
dens-Verbindung der deutschen Par-
tikularstaaten« and praising the Aus-
trägal procedure’s contribution to the 
maintenance of peace in Germany.
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(Articles 18–20 WSA) against Prussia. On June 
11th, 1866, Austria petitioned the Federal Conven-
tion to decree the mobilisation of the federal 
armed forces against Prussia. While Prussia had 
violated two treaties with Austria, this action was 
taken primarily because its military advancement 
in Holstein was a form of »self-help«. Thereby, the 
matter of fact of Article 19 WSA was fulfilled and 
the Federal Convention was called to put an end to 
Prussian self-help. From now on, only immediate 
military measures of the Confederation could de-
fend the »domestic security« of the German Con-
federation and the rights of its members. Austria 
convinced the majority of the Federal Convention. 
In accordance with Article 19 WSA, a federal 
execution (Bundes-Execution) against Prussia was 
agreed upon. With this petition, the legal dispute 
soon turned into an armed struggle for dominance 
in Germany. Following the Confederation’s defeat 
at the hands of Prussia in the »Seven Weeks’ War«, 
on August 23, 1866, the peace treaty of Prague 
terminated the German Confederation – and in 
doing so Austrägal jurisdiction was relegated to 
history.100
9 Austrägal Jurisdiction as Anachronism.
The Lippe Succession Dispute and Paul 
Laband’s Reichs-Austrägalinstanz
Germany’s new constitutional order, following 
the unification process in 1870/71, saw the sover-
eignty of the 25 German states legally and factually 
shrinking in relation to a stronger central power 
under the King of Prussia, who was in personal 
union with the German Emperor (an American 
observer spoke more soberly of the Prussian King’s 
»hereditary presidency«). Even though the German 
states and their princes (forming in sum the Ger-
man Empire as a sovereign state and subject of 
international law) retained their formal sover-
eignty, the Empire’s constitution enumerated es-
sential rights and powers (such as the declaration 
of war) as being reserved for the central power – 
the Reich.101 A number of German states main-
tained their Foreign Offices and diplomatic repre-
sentations in the capitals of Europe, most of all 
their envoys in Berlin. The question of the con-
clusion of international treaties remained challeng-
ing for the new central authority in Berlin, as the 
state administrations enviously guarded sovereign 
state ›rights‹. For example, such disputes arose 
when those German states bordering foreign states 
continued to negotiate their own railway treaties 
or treaties about the exact border delimitations.102
Constitutional disputes were referred to mediation 
by the Federal Council (Bundesrat, the ›first cham-
ber‹ formed by the German princes or their en-
voys). The Reichsgericht, set-up in 1877 as Ger-
many’s central high court, was authorised only to 
hear cases in civil or criminal matters. Disputes 
between member states were to be mediated by the 
Bundesrat (Article 76 Reichs Constitution 1871). 
Private individuals had no recourse in constitu-
tional matters. Whereas the special Austrägal pro-
cedure, according to Article 30 WSA, had opened 
at least a small window in that direction, the 
constitution of 1871 merely copied the provision 
of Article 29 WSA concerning the right of the 
Bundesrat to step-in on behalf of individuals against 
obstructions of justice in any member state.103
Disputes between different German states (their 
administrations or their princes as heads of the 
ruling houses) were unavoidable. In particular, the 
100 Huber (1953/4) 47–56; cf. Betz
(2007) 61.
101 The editor in charge of Germany in 
the Comparative Law Bureau of the 
ABA, Robert P. Shick, described the 
form of government and distribution 
of power in Imperial Germany most 
unenthusiastically: »The German 
Empire is a federal state composed of 
[25 states], these lands being united in 
a great ›corporation of public law‹ 
under the hereditary presidency of 
the King of Prussia. Its Emperor is its 
president, not its monarch. It is an 
extension of the North German Bund 
of July 1, 1867, and the Imperial 
Constitution of 1871 is the Federal 
Constitution revised. The Imperial 
Constitution rests upon the will of 
the Empire. Sovereignty does not re-
side in the Emperor, but in the allied 
powers«. Shick (1909) 60. Contem-
porary English translations of the 
German Constitution of 1871 are 
available in: Dodd (1909) 325–351 
and Howard (1906) 403–435. Cf. 
Kraus (2015) 228 f.; 232.
102 SHStA 1034, MAA Nr. 16.a.1: 6, Held 
to Saxon MFA, 29.5.; 12, Pfretzschner 
to MFA, 28.2.1879.
103 Article 77 RV (1871) »Wenn in einem 
Bundesstaate der Fall einer Justizver-
weigerung eintritt, und auf gesetz-
lichen Wegen ausreichende Hülfe 
nicht erlangt werden kann, so liegt 
dem Bundesrathe ob, erwiesene, nach 
der Verfassung und den bestehenden 
Gesetzen des betreffenden Bundes-
staates zu beurtheilende Beschwerde 
über verweigerte oder gehemmte 
Rechtspflege anzunehmen, und da-
rauf die gerichtliche Hülfe bei der 
Bundesregierung, die zu der Be-




rules of succession to the throne (Thronfolge) in a 
number of German states led to fierce disputes 
between different ruling houses and the branch 
lines. The parties vehemently argued against their 
opposing houses or branches of other ruling fam-
ilies eager to secure the throne for themselves. 
Advocates of the monarchic system were con-
cerned about these ›insults‹ uttered against mon-
archs, which would damage the reputation of the 
monarchy in general and Germany’s constitutional 
system.
Starting in 1890, one of the smallest German 
states, the Fürstentum Lippe (Detmold) became the 
scene of one of the fiercest of these disputes. The 
capability of the Bundesrat to settle such quarrels 
amicably was the subject of doubt from different 
political angles. The German and international 
press reported widely on the succession dispute, 
the opposing parties and their different legal argu-
ments; moreover, questions were asked in parlia-
ment. The history and the legal intricacies of the 
Lippesche Erbfolgestreit have been analysed else-
where; hopefully, it will suffice here to name but 
the most elementary facts and a few of the protag-
onists.104
Following the death of Prince Woldemar of 
Lippe in 1895, the ruling family of Lippe-Detmold 
had (legally) died out. Woldemar had no children 
and his brother Karl Alexander had been incapa-
citated [entmündigt] due to mental illness. Aware of 
the situation that would ensue following his de-
mise, in 1890 Prince Woldemar concluded a secret 
treaty with the Schaumburg-Lippe family (a side 
line of the house of Lippe) declaring its head, 
Prince Adolf of Schaumburg-Lippe, a brother-in-
law of Emperor Wilhelm II, to be his successor in 
Lippe. In April 1895, Prince Adolf was duly ap-
pointed regent of Lippe in place of the incapaci-
tated Karl Alexander, who was now nominally 
sovereign of the Principality of Lippe. However, 
two other – in part older – branch lines of the 
House of Lippe, Lippe-Biesterfeld and Lippe-Wei-
ßenfeld, also made claims to the regency.
The legal dispute concerning the regency of 
Lippe – which was previously just a mere academic 
exercise – was now actually being pursued in 
earnest. Pointing to Lippe’s »house laws«, the 
Lippe-Biesterfeld family, headed by Count Ernest, 
argued that he would be first in the line of 
succession following the extinction of the Lippe-
Detmold line. (In this respect, it is relevant that, 
decades earlier, even the question of the primo-
geniture as the guiding principle of the law of 
succession of the Principality of Lippe was dis-
puted between Lippe-Detmold and Schaumburg-
Lippe. It was decided in the affirmative by an 
Austrägal court in 1838.105) The Schaumburg-
Lippe family, on the other hand, argued that the 
paternal grandmother of Ernest of Lippe-Biester-
feld, Modeste von Unruh, was of lower nobility: 
her status as baroness (Freifrau) was disputed. 
According to the House Laws of Lippe, wives of 
members of the House of Lippe had to be »equal« 
(ebenbürtig to their husbands) in order to make 
legitimate progeny of the marriage eligible to 
succeed. Progeny born of non-equal marriages 
were thus excluded from the succession. However, 
Prince Woldemar’s attempts (starting in 1890) to 
decree just such a reading of the law – which 
would have favoured the Schaumburg-Lippe line 
– failed; not even Emperor Wilhelm II’s public 
intervention on behalf of his brother-in-law was 
sufficient to force the Diet of the Principality to 
accept Adolf of Schaumburg-Lippe’s regency as 
binding and legitimate. Instead, after the involve-
ment of the Bundesrat (Article 76 of the Reich
Constitution) and the Federal Chancellor Hohen-
lohe-Schillingsfürst, the disputing parties agreed in 
1896 to a treaty (Schiedsvertrag) referring the dis-
pute about the regency to an arbitration tribunal 
headed by King Albert of Saxony. While this was a 
step also acceptable to the Lippe Diet, it seriously 
angered Emperor William, who considered him-
self the ›natural‹ arbitrator of the Reich.106
In their 50-page award of 22 June 1897 King 
Albert together with the President of the Reichs-
gericht Otto von Oehlschläger and five Reichsgericht
Justices admitted: »In the ius commune there is 
barely a doctrine that is as contested and, in 
particular by the publicists of the previous century, 
104 Bartels-Ishikawa (1995); 
Fehrenbach (1968) 337–355 (339) 
summarises: »Es ging um den Sou-
veränitätsanspruch eines Bundes-
staats, die Erbfolge ohne Einwirkung 
des Reichs zu regeln«.
105 Bornhak (1890) 384 referring to 
Leonhardi; award of Badisches 
Oberhofgericht 22 December 1838.
106 Fehrenbach (1968) 343 referring to 
the Memoirs of Chancellor Hohen-
lohe; Bartels-Ishikawa (1995) 30.
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as often discussed as the doctrine of equality 
(Ebenbürtigkeit).«107 However, after a long histor-
ical elucidation and argument about the plausibil-
ity of the sources available, the arbitrators accepted 
the »equality« of Modeste von Unruh, and they 
concluded that her grandson Count Ernest of 
Lippe-Biesterfeld was »entitled and competent« 
(berechtigt und berufen) to succeed Prince Karl 
Alexander of Lippe – and thus to take over the 
regency until the Prince’s death.108 Much to the 
chagrin of Emperor William II, Count Ernest then 
took over the regency from the resigning Prince 
Adolf of Schaumburg-Lippe. However, Ernest 
never became Prince of Lippe. He remained regent 
throughout his life since the incapacitated Prince 
Karl Alexander outlived him by one year and died 
in 1905. Ernest’s son, Leopold, was finally en-
throned as Prince Leopold IV of Lippe, but not 
before another arbitration award about his »equal-
ity« was rendered against the claims made by 
Prince Adolf of Schaumburg-Lippe.109
Early on, the parties involved drew on legal 
expertise to substantiate their claims to the regency 
of Lippe. A number of German law professors of 
some fame, like Wilhelm Kahl, Conrad Bornhak 
and, most of all, Paul Laband, professor of con-
stitutional law in Straßburg and author of the 
leading treatise on the issue, wrote long memo-
randa on Lippe’s law of dynastic succession and the 
claims of the lines of Lippe-Biesterfeld and 
Schaumburg-Lippe. These memoranda went into 
great historical, legal and dynastic details and were, 
in particular once they replied to opposing state-
ments, riddled with spiteful remarks.110 In March 
1896, – thus still before the parties had agreed to 
refer their dispute to arbitration – Laband sup-
ported Schaumburg-Lippe’s argumentation by de-
claring categorically in his second memorandum 
on the issue that according to the Lippe »house-
law« the descendants of the Biesterfelder and Wei-
ßenfelder line »bowed out« (ausscheiden) of the 
succession to the Lippe throne since their forefa-
thers had married non-»equal« (ebenbürtig). There-
fore, the incumbent regent Prince of Schaumburg-
Lippe was »of god’s grace« the legitimate heir on 
the throne and should remain in power.111
Evidently, Laband, Imperial Germany’s »grand-
master« of constitutional law,112 was unsatisfied 
with the reasoning of the Supreme Court Justices 
in their arbitration award on the Lippe dispute one 
year later; and in this, he had the most prominent 
intercessor possible: the Emperor. William II was 
angered about the questionable succession to the 
throne and the resulting disputes. He considered 
the entire discussion a threat to the »monarchical 
principle«, but most of all he regretted that his 
brother-in-law had not been awarded the Lippe 
throne. Following the (disappointing) arbitration 
award of June 1897, he asked Laband, whose 
opinion in favour of the Schaumburg-Lippe line 
was by now just as well-known as was his »fidelity 
to the Empire and Prussia«,113 for legal advice. 
Laband provided his sovereign with a creative – 
and rather conservative – solution to the under-
lying problem.
Disputes between the German princes, Laband 
argued, should be settled exclusively amongst 
themselves. He characterised this Fürstengericht as 
107 Schiedsspruch (1897) 10. »Im ge-
meinen Rechte giebt es wohl kaum 
eine Lehre, die so bestritten und, na-
mentlich von den Publizisten des vo-
rigen Jahrhunderts so viel erörtert ist, 
wie die Lehre von der Ebenbürtigkeit. 
Der Hauptstreit in dieser Lehre dreht 
sich im gemeinen Rechte darum, ob 
die von Mitgliedern des hohen Adels 
mit Frauen des niederen Adels ein-
gegangenen Ehen ebenbürtig sind, 
die aus ihnen entsprossenen Kinder 
zur Familie des hochadligen Vaters 
gehören. Darüber wird auch im vor-
liegenden Falle gestritten.«
108 Schiedsspruch (1897) 10.
109 Schiedsspruch (1906); Bartels-
Ishikawa (1995) 35 considers both 
awards as »in their way an Austrägal
award [seiner Art nach ein Austrä-
galurteil].«
110 Laband (1896) 11 »Wenn [Wilhelm] 
Kahl einst seine großen Werke über 
Staatsrecht veröffentlichen wird, 
werden sie vermutlich einen neuen 
Aufschluß bringen über das Recht 
›welches es nicht giebt‹.«; cf. Kahl
(1896); much to the embitterment
of Laband, in 1894 Kahl had been 
appointed to the chair of public law
at the university of Berlin – a post 
Laband had himself hoped to receive, 
cf. Mussgnug (2014) 10 f.
111 Laband (1896) 47; cf. Laband (1918) 
80; 106 retrospectively downplaying 
the pertinence of the dispute: »The 
matter in itself (Die Sache selbst) … 
was irrelevant (ohne Belang)«; he saw 
the »agitation« (wüste Hetze) against 
Prince Adolf as targeting the Empe-
ror.
112 Mussgnug (2014) 3.
113 Mussgnug (2014) 5 speaks of
Laband’s »stramm reichstreu-preu-
ßisches Reden und Agieren«; cf. 
Wehler (2006) 1014; 1370 FN 39 on 
Labands »analytische Brillanz zur 
Reichsverfassung«; Kraus (2015) 233.
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a permanent and central Reichs-Austrägalinstanz – a 
special court for German princes by German prin-
ces. In November 1897, Emperor William, who 
had been repeatedly urged to step in by the rulers 
of Baden, Oldenburg and Schaumburg-Lippe in 
order to find a ›monarchic‹ solution (as opposed to 
the legalistic and ›democratic‹ way pursued by the 
Diet of Lippe and the King of Saxony) to the Lippe 
Thronfolge dispute, sent Laband’s memorandum to 
all of the German princes. It was merely trans-
formed into a private letter, commencing with the 
greeting, »My Dear Cousin!«.The letter laid out the 
question of a Princely Court to arbitrate such 
disputes and explained the gap in the German legal 
order: There was no institution to solve disputes 
regarding the monarchical succession in the Ger-
man states. Despite the seemingly clear primogeni-
tur, disputes still arose: concerning the question of 
equal birth of individuals as future spouses of a 
prince or about legal titles to territories located in 
different German states. The Emperor, therefore, 
argued: »Anyone wanting to become a member of 
the illustrious circle [of the German monarchs], 
must be welcomed and recognized by the German 
princes themselves. Succession disputes [Thronfol-
gestreitigkeiten] cannot be settled by civil courts 
[bürgerliche Gerichte] …. The Throne cannot be 
claimed like an estate and cannot be adjudged or 
denied according to the rules of procedure«. In its 
conclusion, the letter apodictically stated: »Neither 
a judgement by civil servants nor a plebiscite in 
whatever form, but a verdict [Wahrspruch] of the 
German princes shall decide who should be a 
German ruler and comrade in rank and entitle-
ments [Standes- und Rechtsgenosse] of the German 
Sovereigns«.114
However, Paul Laband did not foresee the anger 
his thinly veiled critique of the Reichsgericht Justices 
who – based on «civil« rules of procedure – arro-
gated to »decide who should be a German ruler«, 
would cause among Germany’s princes; and nei-
ther did his principal William II, who made no 
secret out of the fact that he had never welcomed 
Count Ernest in »the illustrious circle« of the Ger-
man monarchs (he sent Adolf a ›farewell‹ telegram, 
but no ›welcoming‹ telegram to Ernest). But 
phrases like, »It contradicts the interests of the 
Reich that such questions [of succession] will be 
decided and the Emperor has no influence on it to 
protect – if necessary – the interests of the Reich«, 
refuted the notion of the Emperor in Berlin as a 
primus inter pares so cherished in Germany’s pro-
vincial capitals.115 The proposed Reichs-Austrägal-
instanz would have been composed of three prin-
ces, appointed by each party, and headed by the 
Emperor. These seven German princes were sup-
posed to decide on the matter themselves and were 
not permitted to delegate it (as King Albert of 
Saxony did in 1896) to their respective councillors 
or judges. Already in his second memorandum on 
the Lippe dispute one year earlier, Laband had 
stated an existing »common sense of justice«116
[gemeinsames Rechtsbewußtsein] of the German dy-
nasties that he now wanted to put to good use: 
»decisive for the verdict [of the Fürstengericht] shall 
be the sense of justice [Rechtsbewußtsein] of the 
German princes, not legal scholarship [juristische 
Schulgelehrtheit]«. The Emperor considered it un-
necessary to submit the proposed compact to the 
provincial Diets; rather, the princes were supposed 
to sign »as heads of their families according to the 
Hausgesetze«. Constitutional validity of the Austrä-
galgericht, according to the legislative process, was 
considered superfluous.117
King Albert clearly recognised the critique 
aimed at the arbitration tribunal that he had pre-
sided over just months earlier and thus felt seri-
ously offended by William’s proposition. Speaking 
in Berlin to the Envoy of Saxony, Imperial Chan-
cellor Hohenlohe emphasised that he was not 
involved in this project of Reichs-Austrägalinstanz. 
Hohenlohe coolly characterised the Emperor’s idea 
114 SHStA 1035, MAA Nr. 3c: 8, William 
II to King of Saxony, 20.11.1897; 
Grundzüge für die Bildung eines 
Fürstengerichts; cf. Fehrenbach
(1968) 345; Bartels-Ishikawa (1995) 
33 FN 148 »cannot confirm« the au-
thorship of Laband – because she 
could not find the sources mentioned 
by Fehrenbach; however, given the 
documents in the Saxon archives 
(Fehrenbach worked with Bavarian 
sources) there cannot be any doubt 
that Laband was the author.
115 Fehrenbach (1968) 337 referring to 
Laband, Reichsstaatsrecht 1919: 58.
116 Laband (1896) 9; Laband was grati-
fied by the fact that his legal opinion 
was sought after; the Lippe memo-
randum was probably his »best-
known«, Mussgnug (2014) 12.
117 SHStA 1035, MAA Nr. 3c: 8, William 
II to King of Saxony, 20.11.1897; 
Grundzüge für die Bildung eines 
Fürstengerichts; »maßgebend soll bei 
der Fällung des Spruchs das im deut-
schen Fürstenstande lebendige 
Rechtsbewußtsein und Rechtsgefühl 
sein, nicht juristische Schulgelehrt-
heit«, on succession to the throne 
disputes cf. Bönnemann (2007) 
101–110.
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as a »private, not a government action« (Regierungs-
handlung) and more or less put the blame on 
Laband. Hohenlohe, who was a relative of Count 
Ernest of Lippe-Biesterfeld and who was thus at 
odds with the Emperor about the Lippe dispute, 
»could not understand why this respected scholar« 
wrote such an »inferior work«. »Due to his pro-
fession, Mr. Laband is required to know that many 
German princes, in particular the more important 
ones, are hindered by their constitutions to join the 
agreement as wished by the Emperor.« Hohenlohe 
referred to Bavaria (where he had been prime 
minister, 1866–1870), and added that the Bavarian 
»government will reject foreign interference in the 
succession to the throne a limine«. Even the Im-
perial Foreign Secretary von Bülow jokingly ques-
tioned »whether the ›King of Prussia‹ will be able 
to do as the ›Kaiser‹ wishes«? (referring to Article 
57 Prussian Constitution 1850].118
The reactions of the German princes were thor-
oughly divided. Some welcomed the idea of the 
Reichs-Austrägalinstanz, others, such as the Regent 
of Bavaria, asked for more time to deliberate the 
idea. The Duke of Saxony-Meiningen utterly re-
jected the proposal of his mighty »cousin«, remind-
ing him that questions of succession to the throne 
were within the exclusive constitutional realm of 
the individual German states (Einzelstaaten). No 
infringement by the Emperor or other Einzelstaa-
ten could be tolerated. The King of Saxony also 
foresaw constitutional hindrances that »prevented 
[him] from pursuing the plan«. The King of Würt-
temberg responded in a long letter that it was 
impossible under the constitution to exclude the 
provincial Diet from questions of succession. The 
Diet could not be forced to accept the arbitration 
by a princely court to which it had never agreed. 
And Württemberg’s parliamentarians were prob-
ably not inclined to leave the decision on impor-
tant domestic disputes to German princes. Thus, 
the competences and legal basis of the Fürstenge-
richt seemed very doubtful to him.119 Finally, the 
Regent of Bavaria rejected the proposal as well. He 
pointed out that under the Imperial constitution, 
the Federal Council should be considered the 
competent institution to decide matters of succes-
sion and admittance of new members (Zulassung 
neuer Mitglieder). In their correspondence to one 
another, the ministers were more blunt in their 
assessment of the Emperor’s proposal: the Diets in 
southern Germany would never accept such a 
dominant status of the Emperor (after all, he was 
the King of Prussia) as arbitrator, and public 
opinion would consider a concession in this re-
spect »as a disgrace«. The Thuringian Envoy, von 
Reitzenstein, summarised the proposal by remind-
ing his government that the Emperor would »prin-
cipally« (grundsätzlich) be the head of the tribunal, 
and, considering the current situation, his opinion 
would always prevail. However, this »opened the 
risk of arbitrary awards« (willkürliche Urteils-
sprüche). While the Emperor wanted to ensure that 
he would have a (final) say in all German Throne 
succession disputes and aimed at excluding the 
Diets from any involvement in »purely dynastic 
affairs«, the German rulers were eager to underline 
their sovereignty and equal standing with the King 
of Prussia. As historian Elisabeth Fehrenbach has 
emphasised, the dispute made evident how unify-
ing tendencies of the Emperor stood at odds with 
the particular interests of the Reichsfürsten – irre-
spective of the fact that both formed a (more or 
less) united front against the claims of parliamen-
tarians to have a say in dynastic affairs.120 In the 
end Laband’s project came to naught; the princely 
Austrägal court was never installed. The term Aus-
trägal as used by Laband and the Emperor pre-
tended to quote an ancient German tradition. But 
there was no genuine belief in Laband’s assump-
tion that the princely »sense of justice« would be 
more advantageous to the German monarchies 
than a »judgement by civil servants«. Other Ger-
man princes used their domestic constitutional 
obligations as a shield against further centralising 
118 SHStA 1035, MAA Nr. 3c: 4, Sax. 
Envoy Berlin to MAA, 8.12.1897.
119 SHStA 1035, MAA Nr. 3c: 12; 19, 31, 
Saxon Envoy Berlin to MAA, 
14.12.1897; 21., 29.1.1898.
120 SHStA 1035, MAA Nr. 3c: 25, Nostiz, 
Munich to Metzsch, Dresden, 
24.1.1898; 34, Reitzenstein, Weimar, 




encroachments by the King of Prussia and German 
Emperor.
The last vestiges of Austrägal jurisdiction in the 
German Reich were still visible in the introduc-
tory law to the court constitution act. § 7 Einfüh-
rungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (1877) con-
firmed that special courts among noble peers in 
criminal matters remained in force as stipulated by 
state law. In Prussia, these laws concerning the 
nobility’s Recht auf Austräge in Strafsachen dated 
back to 1820 and 1854. The revolution of 1918 
finally put an end to special courts for different 
ranks of society.The Weimar Republic saw disputes 
between the Reich’s member states or between 
states and the Reich as to be decided by the Reichs-
gericht. But that is another story.

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